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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the Amended Memorandum Decision and Final
Judgment of Dismissal and the Final Judgment of the district court dismissing a
stockholder derivative complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections
78A-3-102(3)G) and 78A-4-103(2)G) of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue:

Did the district court err in granting the motion to dismiss of

defendants-appellees Directors and Officers (as defined herein) for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the
complaint alleged that the Directors and Officers of a Utah corporation engaged
in self-interested misconduct, breached their fiduciary duties and committed
other violations of law by manipulating the price of equity awards for their own
personal benefit at the expense of the corporation and its stockholders?

Standard of Review: The propriety of a district court's dismissal under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a question of
law, and therefore is entitled to "no deference" and is "review[ed] under a
correctness standard." Helf v. Chevron U.SA., Inc., 2009 UT

11,

ii 14, 203 P.3d

962 (citations and internal quotations omitted); Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mtn.

Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ii 10, 232 P.3d 999.
Preservation:

This issue was preserved in plaintiff-appellant James

Robert Rawcliffe's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

(R. 435-69), his Notice of Supplemental Authority (R. 509-62), and at the
January 23, 2015 hearing on the Directors and Officers' motion to dismiss (R.
755-824).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Not applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a stockholder derivative action brought by plaintiff-appellant James

Robert Rawcliffe ("Rawcliffe") on behalf of nominal defendant-appellee USANA
Health Sciences, Inc. ("USANA" or the "Company"). Rawcliffe alleges that the
members of the Compensation Committee (the "Compensation Committee") of
USANA's Board of Directors (the "Board") breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty
owed to USANA and wasted corporate assets by deliberately granting themselves
and other directors and officers of the Company equity awards that were "springloaded," i.e., granted just prior to the release of material information that was
reasonably expected to drive the market price of the Company's stock higher,
thereby artificially increasing the value of the equity awards by establishing an
artificially low exercise price.

Rawcliffe also alleges that the Directors' and

Officers' receipt of such spring-loaded equity awards constituted a further breach
of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment of the recipients.
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II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Rawcliffe filed his Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint (the

"Complaint") on August 4, 2014.

(R. 1-70).

Defendants-appellees Robert

Anciaux a/k/a Robert Auciaux ("Anciaux"), Jerry G. McClain ("McClain"),
Ronald S. Poelman ("Poelman"), James H. Bramble, Jim Brown, Gilbert Fuller
("Fuller"), Kevin G. Guest, Daniel A. Macuga, David A. Wentz ("D. Wentz"), and
Deborah Woo (collectively, the "Directors and Officers") moved to dismiss the
Complaint on October 2, 2014. (R. 230-427). Rawcliffe filed his opposition brief
on November 13, 2014, (R. 435-69), and the Directors and Officers filed their
reply brief on December

11,

2014, (R. 470-86). On January 9, 2015, Rawcliffe

filed a notice of supplemental authority attaching a case involving similar facts
that had recently been decided in the Delaware Court of Chancery in which the
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 509-62). On January 23,
2015, the district court held a hearing on the Directors and Officers' motion to

dismiss. (R. 755-824).

III.

DISPOSITION AT DISTRICT COURT
On March 18, 2015, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (the "Original Memorandum").
(R. 567-79).

On April 3, 2015, the district court entered an Amended

Memorandum and Decision and Final Judgment of Dismissal (the "Amended
Memorandum"), which superseded the Original Memorandum. (R. 604-20). 1
1

A copy of the Amended Memorandum is attached at Addendum A.

On September 22, 2015, the district court2 entered an appealable Final
Judgment.3 Rawcliffe timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 6, 2015. (R.
721-25).
The district court concluded that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the
grounds that the spring-loading of equity awards does not constitute breach of
fiduciary duty, waste, or unjust enrichment under Utah law. In so doing, the
court held, inter alia, that the conduct complained of did not violate the
Company's equity incentive award plan and was protected by the business
judgment rule.

The Amended Memorandum was entered by the Honorable Keith A. Kelly. The
case was subsequently reassigned and the Final Judgment was entered by the
Honorable Heather Brereton. (R. 716-720).
2

3 Rawcliffe filed his original Notice of Appeal on April 10, 2015 (Case No.
20150365). (R. 621-26). On July 1, 2015, the Supreme Court entered an Order
electing to retain the appeal on its docket. A copy of the Order is attached at
Addendum B. On July 22, 2015, the Supreme Court issued an order notifying the
parties that it was considering sua sponte dismissal of the appeal on the grounds
that it lacked appellate jurisdiction under CUWCD v. King, 2013 UT 13, 297 P.3d
619, because the Amended Memorandum entered by the district court did not
state that no further order was necessary and therefore was not a final,
appealable order under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R.
704). On August 5, 2015, Rawcliffe requested that the Supreme Court dismiss the
appeal without prejudice so that he could obtain a final, appealable order from
the district court. A copy of Appellant's Memorandum Addressing Supreme
Court's Jurisdiction is attached at Addendum C. The Supreme Court granted
Rawcliffe's request on September 2, 2015. (R. 702-04). On September 22, 2015,
Rawcliffe, on behalf of all parties to the action, submitted a Joint Request for
Entry of Final Judgment and a proposed Final Judgment to the district court,
which was entered the same day. (R. 705-20 ).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

BACKGROUND
USANA is a Utah corporation that, according to its public filings, develops

and manufactures "high-quality, science-based nutritional and personal care
products."

(R. 4).

In 2006, USANA's Board adopted, and its stockholders

approved, the USANA Health Sciences, Inc. 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan
(the "Plan"). (R. 10, 31-56). The stated purpose of the Plan was, among other
things, to align the interests of the directors and officers of the Company with its
stockholders "by reinforcing the relationship between participants' rewards and
shareholder gains." (R. 10, 31). The Compensation Committee, consisting of
Anciaux, McClain and Poelman, administers the Plan. (R. 10-11). Under the
terms of the Plan, the Compensation Committee is authorized to grant directors,
officers, or employees of the Company various types of equity awards, including
stock-settled stock appreciation rights ("SSARs"), which are rights to receive a
bonus equal to the difference between the exercise price of the right and the
trading price of USANA's stock on the date the right is exercised. (R. 11, 31-56).
The Plan requires that the exercise price of SSARs "shall not be less than 100% of
Fair Market Value on the date of grant," which the Plan defines as the thencurrent trading price of USANA common stock. (R. 11, 40).
II.

THE GRANTING OF THE SPRING-LOADED SSARS
After the market closed on February 4, 2014, USANA issued a press release

reporting net sales for the fourth quarter of $186.3 million, an increase of 10.5%
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over the same period in 2012, and net sales for the year of $718.2 million, a 10.7%
increase over 2012. (R. 12). USANA's net sales and earnings per share figures for
fiscal year 2013 significantly exceeded analysts' estimates, as did the Company's
guidance for fiscal year 2014. (Id.). Indeed, USANA's Chief Executive Officer,
defendant-appellee D. Wentz, touted fiscal year 2013 as "an exceptional year."
(R. 13).

On February 6, 2014, each of the Directors and Officers identified in the
chart below filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") a Form 4
disclosing that on February 3, 2014-just one day before the Company's 2013
results and 2014 guidance were publicly announced-the Compensation
Committee members had granted each of the Directors and Officers, including

the Compensation Committee members themselves, SSARs with an
exercise price of $s7.62 per share, which was the closing price of USANA's stock
on February 3rd:

Name
Robert Anciaux
James H. Bramble
Jim Brown
Gilbert Fuller
Kevin G. Guest
Daniel A. Macuga
Jerry G. McClain

Title
Director and
Compensation
Committee member
Chief Legal Officer and
Secret~

Chief Production Officer
Director
President of North
America
Chief Communications
Officer
Director and
Com_Q_ensation
-6-

Numbeirof
SSARs Awarded
12,000
37,000
32,500
12,000
58,500
34,500
12,000

Committee member
Director and
Ronald S. Poelman
Compensation
Committee Chair
David A. Wentz
Chief Executive Officer
Deborah Woo
President of Asia Pacific
Total

12,000
40,983
58,000
30_21_483

(R. 13-14).
At the time Compensation Committee granted over 300,000 SSARspresently worth approximately $19.5 million4-to themselves and other insiders,
the Compensation Committee was aware of the Company's successful financial
results, knew the Company would release the results the next day, and expected
that the Company's stock price would increase substantially upon the release of
the results. (R. 14). Indeed, upon the release of these results, the trading price of
shares of USANA's common stock jumped to $68-46 per share on February 5th,
an 18.8% increase over the trading price when the SSARs were granted on
February 3rd. (Id.). Thus, the Compensation Committee members deliberately
granted the SSARs to themselves and the other Directors and Officers
immediately before the earnings release in order use this inside information to
take advantage of the market price of USANA's stock on February 3rd before the
earnings news caused the market price to rise.

(Id.).

The Compensation

Committee members' deliberate granting of the SSARs prior to the earnings
release ensured that the SSARs carried an artificially low exercise price, which
4 Based on USANA's trading price of $120.62 on March 21, 2016. Yahoo! Finance
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=USNA&a=o2&b=21&c=2016&d=o2&e=21&f=
2016&g=d.

made the SSARs more valuable to the Directors and Officers by reducing the
price USANA stock would have to exceed for the SSARs to be "in the money."
This practice, the granting of equity awards just prior to the release of
material information that is reasonably expected to drive the market price of a
company's stock higher, thereby artificially increasing the value of the equity
awards by establishing an artificially low exercise price, is known as "springloading."

It is well-established under Delaware law that spring-loading is

improper and constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by the grantors and
recipients of such equity awards. The Delaware Court of Chancery has succinctly
described the misconduct of spring-loading: "[w]hen you engage in behavior that,
based on the allegation of the complaint, appears self-interested such that you
give yourself assets for less than their fair value, that's classic breach of the duty
of loyalty stuff." In re CytRx Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9864VCL, Oral Argument, Defendants' Motions to Stay or Dismiss and the Court's
Rulings (TRANSCRIPT) at 41:13-18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2015).s To be sure, springloading is "eyebrow-raising self-interested conduct." Id. at 38:13.

III.

THE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS' HISTORY OF SIMILAR
MISCONDUCT
The members of the Compensation Committee, as well as USANA's

Chairman of the Board and controlling stockholder Myron Wentz ("M. Wentz"),
have a history of engaging in improper activities relating to USANA equity
s A copy of the CytRx transcript, which contains the court's oral opinion, is

attached at Addendum D.
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awards to benefit themselves and other USANA directors and officers. (R. 15).
Indeed, a review of past equity awards granted by the Compensation Committee
demonstrates that the Compensation Committee has been manipulating the
granting of equity awards since 2006-as long as the Plan has been in existence.
(Id.).

USANA typically announces its quarterly and year-end earmngs on a
Tuesday after the close of the stock market. (R. 15). In 2008, 2010, and 2014,
the Compensation Committee awarded SSARs to various directors and officers
immediately before the release of quarterly earnings, and each time, the trading
price of the Company's stock increased following the earnings release:

Total
SSARs
Granted

Date of
Earnings
Release

$26.06

1,370,000

Ju!Y_ 22, 2008

Stock
Price
After
Earnings
Release 6
$28.14

$35-47

412,500

April 27, 2010

$38.17

7.6%

$57.62

309,483

February 4,
2014

$68-46

18.8%

Date of
Exercise
SSARGrant
Price
Ju!Y_ 21, 2008
April 27,
2010
February 3,
2014

Percent
Increase
8.0%

(R. 15-16).
In contrast, in 2006, 2007, and 2011, the Compensation Committee chose
to wait to award SSARs or stock options until immediately after the release of
quarterly earnings, and each time, the trading price of the Company's stock

decreased following the earnings release:
6

Closing price the day after earnings were announced, i.e., July 23, 2008, April
28, 2010, and February 5, 2014, respectively. (R. 16).
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Total
Equity
Awards
Granted

Date of
Earnings
Release

Stock
Price
Priorb>
Earnings
Release?

Percent
Decrease

$37.60

2,956
options
164,956
SSARs

April 18,
2006

$41.79

10.0%

$40.59

4,587
options

April 17,
2007

$42.82

5.2%

$28.16

78,000
SSARs

July 26,
2011

$31.76

11.3%

Date (Type)
Exercise
of Equity
Price
Grant
April 26,
2006 (stock
options and
SSARs)
April 19,
2007 (stock
o_Qtions)
July 27, 2011
(SSARs)
(R. 16).

The timing of these equity awards is hardly a coincidence. (R. 16). Rather,
each time the Compensation Committee granted equity awards, its members
manipulated the timing to ensure that the equity awards had the lowest possible
exercise price, and thus the highest possible value to the recipients. (Id.). In
2008 and 2010, as in 2014, the Compensation Committee granted SSARs that
were spring-loaded, while in 2006, 2007, and 2011, the Compensation
Committee purposely delayed the grant of equity awards until after negative news
was released, which caused the stock price, and thus the exercise price of the
equity awards, to go down, a practice referred to as "bullet-dodging." (R. 16-17). 8

Closing price the day earnings were announced, i.e., April 18, 2006, April 17,
2007, and July 26, 2011, respectively. (Id.).

7

Bullet-dodging is the corollary to spring-loading and likewise constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig.,
919 A.2d 563, 576 n.16, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007). Bullet-dodging provides the
recipients of the equity awards with a lower exercise price than they would have
received if the grant of the equity awards had not been delayed. As a result, the
8
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In addition, between December 10, 2012 and December 12, 2012, McClain,
Poelman and M. Wentz collectively sold over $20.3 million worth of Company
stock.

(R. 17).

Shortly after their selling spree, USANA announced a

"reorganization of its management team," including the resignation of several
executive officers, which sent the Company's shares tumbling. (R. 17-18). The
timing and amount of these stock sales strongly indicate that McClain, Poelman,
and M. Wentz sold their USANA stock on the basis of and because of their
knowledge of material nonpublic information concerning the impending
departures of the Company's executive officers. (R. 18). Notably, for Poelman
and McClain, the amounts sold constituted their entire holdings in USANA
common stock at the time. (Id.).
Hence, the February 2014 spring-loading of which Rawcliffe complains in
this action is not an isolated incident. Rather, it is part of a consistent pattern of
misconduct in connection with equity awards granted by the Compensation
Committee and of corporate insiders taking advantage of inside information for
their own personal benefit. 9

recipients of bullet-dodged equity awards are able to reap a gain when the stock
price recovers from the negative news that precipitated the drop.
Utah law requires that a stockholder seeking to enforce derivative claims on
behalf of a corporation must have been a stockholder of the corporation at the
time of the wrongdoing complained of. See Utah Code§ 16-1oa-740(2)(a). Here,
Rawcliffe has been a stockholder of USANA since October 23, 2013, and therefore
could not bring claims on behalf of the Company for the spring-loading, bulletdodging and insider sales that took place prior to such date.
9
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IV.

RAWCLIFFE MADE A PROPER PRE-SUIT DEMAND, WHICH
WAS WRONGFULLY REFUSED
Utah Code§ 16-1oa-740(3) requires that before filing a derivative action to

challenge misconduct by officers and directors of a Utah corporation, a
stockholder must first make a written demand on the board of directors to take
action to address the wrongdoing. The purpose of this statutory scheme is to
allow the board of directors the first opportunity to take appropriate action,
including conducting a good faith investigation of the alleged wrongdoing. Thus,
in accordance with Utah law, on March 18, 2014, Rawcliffe made a demand (the
"Demand") on the Board to commence an action against the Directors and
Officers in connection with the spring-loaded SSARs granted in February 2014.
(R. 19, 58-60). Specifically, Rawcliffe demanded that the Board take action to
recover damages that USANA has sustained, rescind the grants of the SSARs to
the Directors and Officers, and correct the deficiencies in the Company's internal
controls that allowed the misconduct to occur. (Id.).
On May 28, 2014, USANA's counsel sent a letter rejecting the Demand (the
"Rejection Letter"). (R. 19-20, 62-66). Such a response was not surprising, as
the Board-comprised almost entirely of the same individuals who granted
and/ or received the improperly granted SSARs 10 -did not appoint independent
individuals to investigate Rawcliffe's claims as contemplated by Utah's statutory
Specifically, the Board consists of defendant-appellees Anciaux, Fuller,
McClain and Poelman, all of whom received the spring-loaded SSARs, and Board
Chairman M. Wentz, whose son, D. Wentz, also received the spring-loaded
SSARs. (R. 4-7, 14).

10
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scheme, nor did it prepare a written report in connection with the purported
investigation. (R. 20, 70). Rather, the so-called investigation simply rubberstamped the Directors' and Officers' misconduct, "conclud[ing] that the February
2014 SSARs grants were in conformity with governing law and consistent with

USANA's 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan [and] the [Compensation]
Committee's action was proper and undertaken in good faith." (R. 19-20, 62).
The Rejection Letter provided absolutely no facts regarding what the
purported investigation entailed, e.g., the extent to which documents were
reviewed or witnesses were interviewed, if at all. (R. 20, 62-66). Instead, the
Rejection Letter attempted to provide a legitimate explanation for how the
Compensation Committee members, year after year, granted themselves and
their fellow Directors and Officers equity awards at consistently low prices. (Id.).
However, this explanation was simply not credible, as it was based upon
numerous factual misrepresentations and clearly demonstrated that the Board
failed to perform a good-faith, reasonable investigation as required by Utah law.
(R. 21-24).

For example, the Rejection Letter contended that the timing of all grants of
equity awards was dictated solely by the schedule of Compensation Committee
meetings, which were typically held on Mondays, one day before corresponding
Board meetings held on Tuesdays. (R. 21, 64). A review of the Company's SEC
filings clearly demonstrates this statement is false.

Indeed, while USANA

typically announces its earnings on Tuesdays after the close of the stock market,
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the Compensation Committee has only granted equity awards on Mondays twice,
and on both occasions the trading price of USANA's stock increased following the
Tuesday earnings release. (R. 22). In contrast, when disappointing results were
released, the Compensation Committee delayed the grant of awards until after
such results were made public, i.e., until Wednesday or Thursday, after the news
had caused the stock price to decrease.

(Id.).

Thus, the timing of the

Compensation Committee's grants of Plan-based awards to themselves and their
fellow directors has never been "solely attributable to[ ] USANA's standard
scheduling for board and board committee meetings" as the Rejection Letter
contends.

(R. 21-22).

Rather, the Compensation Committee has varied the

timing of equity awards, including the days of the week on which they are
granted, yet has consistently granted awards with exercise prices most favorable
to the recipients, including themselves. (R. 22).
In addition, the Rejection Letter asserts that the Compensation Committee
could not have predicted that the Company's stock price would rise following the
February 4, 2014 earnings release because "USANA's share price has historically
defied that kind of prediction." (R. 23, 64). The Rejection Letter provides a
single example, when the Company's stock dropped from $40.21 on February 8,
2011 to $35.00 on February 9, 2011 despite the purported announcement of

"positive news" on February 8, 2011.

(R. 23, 64-65).

In actuality, the news

announced on February 8, 2011 was anything but positive, as USANA announced
earnings per share and guidance for the year that were substantially lower than
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analysts' estimates and stated that the Company's outlook was "cautious" because
investments required to integrate a newly acquired business would be higher
than originally estimated. (R. 23-24). In sum, the Rejection Letter and the socalled investigation into the Directors' and Officers' own wrongdoing is just
another example of the Board members' complete abdication of their fiduciary
duties as directors of a Utah corporation.

V.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE ACTION
Rawcliffe filed his Complaint on August 4, 2014. (R. 1-70). The Complaint

asserts four counts against the Directors and Officers: Counts I and II assert
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and waste of corporate assets, respectively,
against the Compensation Committee members for granting the spring-loaded
SSARs. (R. 24-25). Counts III and IV assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and unjust enrichment against the Directors and Officers in connection with their
receipt of the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 25-26).
The Directors and Officers moved to dismiss the Complaint on October

2,

2014. (R. 230-427). Rawcliffe filed his opposition brief on November 13, 2014,
(R. 435-69), and the Directors and Officers filed their reply brief on December 11,

2014, (R. 470-86). On January 9, 2015, Rawcliffe filed a notice of supplemental
authority attaching the transcript opinion in CytRx, in which the Delaware Court
of Chancery denied the defendants' motion to dismiss substantially similar
claims. (R. 509-62). On January 23, 2015, the district court held a hearing on
the Directors' and Officers' motion to dismiss. (R. 755-824).
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On March 18, 2015, the district court entered the Original Memorandum
granting the Directors' and Officers' motion to dismiss. (R. 567-79). On April 3,
2015, the district court entered the Amended Memorandum, which superseded
the Original Memorandum. (R. 604-20) . The district court concluded that the
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on the
grounds that the spring-loading of equity awards does not constitute breach of
fiduciary duty, waste, or unjust enrichment under Utah law. Specifically, the
district court held that the Compensation Committee members complied with the
strict letter of the Plan, (R. 611-613, 615), and therefore it did not matter that the
Compensation Committee members had material inside information that they
knew would cause USANA's stock price to increase. The district court also held
that because they complied with the strict letter of the Plan, the Compensation
Committee's conduct was protected by the business judgment rule. (R. 612-14).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in holding that the spring-loading of equity awards
does not constitute breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, or corporate
waste. The duty of loyalty is well-established in the State of Utah. See, e.g.,

Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) ("Directors and officers have
a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders."). And Utah
courts have long held that directors who engage in self-dealing are liable to the
corporation and its stockholders for breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty. Id.
at 732 (holding that directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by usurping
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corporate opportunity); Fausett v. Am. Res. Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234,
1241 (D. Utah 1982) (recognizing that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists
when a corporate officer engages in insider trading). The question of whether the
spring-loading of equity awards is one of the various types of conduct that
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty is an issue of first impression in Utah. But
this issue has been litigated in other jurisdictions, including Delaware and at least
one federal district court, which have consistently held that spring-loading equity
awards constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., CytRx, Tr.
at 39:13-40:2 (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary duty by
approving spring-loaded stock option grants); Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433,
448 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., 919
A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); Ausikaitis v. Kiani, 962 F. Supp. 2d 661,
679 (D. Del. 2013) (same).
In granting the Directors and Officers' motion to dismiss, the district court
first misinterpreted these cases, (R. 613-15), as discussed below, and then chose
not to follow them in any event, (R. 615). Rawcliffe respectfully submits that this
was error. The courts of Utah often look to the courts of Delaware for guidance
on matters of corporate law, particularly where there is "no Utah authority
squarely on point." See, e.g., Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App 52,

~~8,

11-13,

345 P.3d 1273 (relying on Delaware law in reversing district court's denial of an
injunction to prevent the sale of stock). Here, there is no Utah law squarely on
point, and the facts alleged in this action are identical to those in CytRx, Weiss
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and Tyson, in which the courts held that the plaintiffs adequately stated claims
for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty against the directors who awarded the springloaded equity awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 39:13-40:2; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 448;

Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; (2) breach of fiduciary duty against the directors and
officers who knowingly received the spring-loaded awards, see CytRx, Tr. at
41:11-18; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449; (3) unjust enrichment against the recipients of
the awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 41:19-42:10; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 449-50; Tyson, 919
A.2d at 602-03; and (4) waste of corporate assets against the directors who
granted the awards, see CytRx, Tr. at 40:3-41:10; Weiss, 948 A2d. at 450.
Accordingly, Rawcliffe's Complaint clearly states claims against the Directors and
Officers in connection with the spring-loaded SSARs.
The district court erroneously distinguished the instant case from Tyson
and Weiss on the grounds that here, the Plan required the Compensation
Committee to use the trading price of USANA's stock on the date the SSARs were
granted as the exercise price. (R. 615). In fact, this is precisely what the plans in

Tyson and Weiss required, but the courts in those cases held that the equity
award grants, which were made with the benefit of material non-public
information that the defendants knew would cause the stock price to increase,
"undermine[d] the very objectives" of the plans' requirements that the exercise
price be equal to fair market value. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592-93. Furthermore,
this conduct is not protected by the business judgment rule because the Directors
and Officers "possessed material non-public information that would affect the
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company's share price" and issued the SSARs "with an intent to circumvent
otherwise valid stockholder-approved restrictions" on the exercise price of the
SSARs, i.e., the fair market value requirement. Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442 n.21
(citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 & n.75). In sum, the instant case is factually and
legally indistinguishable from Tyson and Weiss . Accordingly, the district court's
dismissal of the Complaint should be reversed. To hold otherwise would be to
encourage fiduciaries of Utah corporations to manipulate the timing of equity
awards to line their own pockets at the expense of the corporations and
stockholders they serve.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THE
COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR BREACH OF
THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR GRANTING THE
SPRING-LOADED SSARS

A.

Utah Law Prohibits Self-Dealing By Corporate Fiduciaries,
and the Spring-Loading of Equity Awards Is a Type of SelfDealing

The district court erred in holding that spring-loading does not constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty in Utah. The duty of loyalty is well-established in the
State of Utah. See, e.g., Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730 ("Directors and officers have
a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders."); Elggren v.

Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 192, 228 P. 906 (Utah 1924) ("Directors of a corporation
occupy a position of trust and confidence and are considered in the law as
standing in a fiduciary relation toward the stockholders"). Utah courts have long
held that directors who engage in self-dealing are liable to the corporation and its
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stockholders for breaching their fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Nicholson,
642 P.2d at 732 (holding that directors breached fiduciary duty of loyalty by
usurping corporate opportunity); Elggren, 64 Utah at 192 ("The directors of a
corporation are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to
further their private interests .... "(citations and quotations omitted)).
Indeed, as early as 1924, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "courts
have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy which minimizes the
temptation of officers of corporations to prefer their own interests rather than
those of the corporation and the stockholders." Id. at 194. The Utah Supreme
Court has further recognized that:
As agents intrusted with the management of the

corporation for the benefit of the stockholders and
creditors, [directors] occupy a fiduciary relation, and are
held liable to the corporation as trustees. . . . "Directors
and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in
all transactions touching their duties to the corporation
and its property. . . . All their acts must be for the
benefit of the corporation and not for their own benefit.
. . . They are not permitted to profit as individuals by
virtue of their position."

Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 384-85, 296 P.
231(Utah1931) (quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272); see also Nicholson, 642
P.2d at 730 ("Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their
corporation and its stockholders. . . . They are obligated to use their ingenuity,
influence, and energy, and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to
preserve and enhance the property and earning power of the corporation, even if
the interests of the corporation are m conflict with their own personal
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interests."); Bingham Consol. Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, ii 22, 105 P.3d
365 (same) .
There are many different ways in which a director or officer can breach his
or her fiduciary duties owed to a corporation.

See, e.g., C&Y Corp. v. Gen.

Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (providing several
examples of conduct that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, including:
usurpation of corporate opportunity; using "confidential information to the
corporation's detriment"; and "urg[ing] the corporation to sell an asset to the
detriment of the corporation and its stockholders"); Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1241
(recognizing that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists when a corporate
officer engages in insider trading).
The instant action is the first Utah case in which corporate directors are
alleged to have breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by spring-loading equity
awards. In such circumstances, Utah courts often look to the courts of Delaware
for guidance on matters of corporate law, particularly where, as here, there is "no
Utah authority squarely on point." See, e.g., Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App
52, i!ii8, 11-13, 345 P.3d 1273 (relying on Delaware law in reversing district court's
denial of an injunction to prevent the sale of stock); Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63,
iJiJ24-26, 289 P.3d 479 (relying on and adopting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91
(Del. 2006) regarding the distinction between derivative and direct claims);

Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 132-35 (Utah 1997) (relying on
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. , 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) in determining fair value of
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stock in appraisal proceeding brought pursuant to Utah statute); Nicholson, 642
P.2d at 730 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939) in discussing the
fiduciary duty ofloyalty owed by corporate directors).
Delaware courts have consistently held that spring-loading allegations
identical to those here are sufficient to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., CytRx, Tr. at 39:13-40:2; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 448;

Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593. As explained by Delaware's then-Chancellor Chandler:
The relevant issue is whether a director acts in bad faith
by authorizing options with a market-value strike price,
as he is required to do by a shareholder-approved
incentive option plan, at a time when he knows those
shares are actually worth more than the exercise price.
A director who intentionally uses inside knowledge not
available to shareholders in order to enrich employees
while avoiding shareholder-imposed requirements
cannot, in my opinion, be said to be acting loyally and in
good faith as a fiduciary.

Tyson , 919 A.2d at 592-93 (emphasis in original).11 At least one federal court
faced with substantially identical allegations is in agreement. Ausikaitis, 962 F.
Courts across the country have routinely found that corporate fiduciaries who
engage in another form of manipulating the price of equity awards to take
advantage of a low stock price referred to as "backdating" have breached their
fiduciary duties. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357-58 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(finding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary where the complaint
alleged that corporate fiduciaries granted and/ or received backdated stock
options); Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28, 40 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying motion to
dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim where complaint alleged that corporate
fiduciaries granted and/or received backdated stock options) ; In re THQ, Inc.
Derivative Litig., No. BC 357600, 2007 WL 4990689, at *3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2007) (same); Edmonds v. Getty, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1276-77 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (same); Belova v. Sharp, No. CV 07-299-MO, 2008 WL 700961, at
*8 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2008) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of
fiduciary where the complaint alleged that corporate fiduciaries granted and/or
11

-22-

Supp. 2d at 679. 12 Utah should follow these decisions and hold that the springloading of equity awards to directors and officers of a Utah corporation
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.
B.

The Instant Action Is Nearly Identical to Tyson, Weiss, and
CytRx, All of Which Upheld Claims for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Arising from Allegations of Spring-Loading

The allegations in the present action are nearly identical to the successful
pleadings in Tyson, Weiss, and CytRx. In Tyson, the plaintiffs alleged that on
four occasions between 1999 and 2003, "[d]ays before Tyson would issue press
releases that were very likely to drive stock prices higher, the Compensation
Committee would award options to key employees." Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576. For
example, the plaintiffs alleged that on September 19, 2003, the Tyson
compensation committee granted stock options to a number of executives and
directors at $13.33 per share. Id. On September 23, 2003, Tyson announced that
its earnings would exceed Wall Street's expectations, and its stock price increased
to $14.25. Id. The court held that this conduct constituted a "deception" because
the compensation committee authorized the stock options with a market-value
strike price when they knew those shares were actually worth more than the
received backdated stock options); In re Atmel Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 064592-JF (HRL), 2008 WL 2561957, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008) (same);
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Olofson, No. 08-2344-CM, 2009 WL 1580296, at
*lo (D. Kan. June 3, 2009) (same).
Allegations of spring-loading of equity awards, which resulted in false and
misleading financial statements because of their effect on the company's reported
compensation expense, have also been held to be sufficient to state claims for
violations of federal securities laws. See Hall v. The Children's Place Retail
Stores, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
12
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market value. Id. at 592-93. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs had
adequately stated a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 593.
Similarly, in Weiss, the plaintiff alleged that the directors of Linear
Technology Corporation ("Linear") granted spring-loaded stock options to
various recipients "just prior to the quarterly earnings release" when the directors
knew "the quarterly earnings release contained material information expected to
drive up the market price of Linear's shares." Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439. Following
the reasoning set forth in Tyson, the court in Weiss held that these allegations
stated a claim against the defendants for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Id. at443.
Finally, m CytRx, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant directors
attended a board meeting during which they were informed that an important
clinical trial relating to the company's primary drug had received positive and
"transformational" results, which was the most important news in the company's
history. Id. at 29:1-15. The very next day, the compensation committee granted
to themselves and their fellow directors options to purchase stock with an
exercise price of $2.39 per share, which was the trading price of the company's
stock at the time. Id. at 29:16-20. The information regarding the clinical trial
was not yet public when the options were granted. Id. at 29:20-23. The following
day, the company issued a press release touting the positive results of the trials,
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which over the course of two days sent the stock price up to a two-year high of
$6.12 per share. Id. at 30:2-8. The court summarized the allegations as follows:
So just to review, December 9th, you find out about these
great transformational results. December 10th, before
the results are disclosed and at a time when you know
these results are confidential and that the information is
not public, you grant yourself and your senior officers
approximately 3 million options at a strike price
reflecting the price of the stock without any market
knowledge of this information. And then the next day,
you release the information, and then, indeed, the stock
price spikes.

Id. at 30:9-19. The court observed that "[i]t really would be difficult to design a
fact pattern that would more graphically capture what spring-loading is all about.
It's almost like a law school hypothetical. ... " Id. at 39:18-21. Accordingly, the
court held that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the
granting directors. Id. at 40:2.
The allegations in the Complaint in this case are indistinguishable from
those in Tyson, Weiss, and CytRx. First, the Complaint alleges that the SSARs
were granted pursuant to the Plan, which was approved by USANA's stockholders
and contained express restrictions on the exercise price of equity awards granted
thereunder. (R. 10-11); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442. Second,
the Complaint alleges that the Compensation Committee members (Anciaux,
McClain and Poelman) knew USANA was about to announce quarterly and yearend earnings that would cause the Company's stock price to increase. Indeed, on
the day of the SSAR grants they attended a meeting of the Audit Committee at
which they reviewed the Company's financial statements. (R. 14, 22-23); Tyson,
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919 A.2d at 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 442-43; CytRx, Tr. at 29:9-15. Third, the
Complaint alleges that the Compensation Committee members approved the
spring-loaded SSARs with the intent to circumvent the stockholder-approved
restriction that the exercise price of the SSARs be equal to the fair market value
of USANA stock as of the date of the grant. (R. 14-17); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593;

Weiss, 948 A.2d at 443; CytRx, Tr. at 29:16-30:19. As the Delaware Court of
Chancery held in Tyson, "[s]uch allegations would satisfy a plaintiffs
requirement to show adequately at the pleading stage that a director acted
disloyally and in bad faith." Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593; see also Weiss, 948 A.2d at
443 ("These particularized allegations support an inference that the Director
Defendants granted spring-loaded ... options."); Ausikaitis, 962 F. Supp. 2d at
679 ("[P]laintiff has pled particularized facts that give rise to an inference that the
directors intentionally violated the Compensation Plans, which would be a breach
of the fiduciary duty ofloyalty."). 13
The district court did not separately address Rawcliffe's breach of duty claims
against the recipients of the spring-loaded SSARs. Such claims have also been
consistently upheld by the Delaware courts. In Weiss, the court held:

1

3

Weiss has also stated a claim [for breach of fiduciary duty] against
the Officer Defendants and Maier for receiving the challenged
grants. Here, the complaint alleges that these individuals knew or,
absent recklessness, should have known that the grants violated the
stockholder-approved option plans. Under the liberal pleading
standards of this court, this knowledge may be averred generally.
Such allegations, taken as true, support an inference that the Officer
Defendants and Maier, via their receipt of the options,
breached their fiduciary duties.

Id. at 449 (emphasis added). See also CytRx, Tr. at 41:13-18 ("When you engage
in behavior that, based on the allegation of the complaint, appears self-interested
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C.

The Terms of the Plan Do Not Permit Spring-Loading

The district court's dismissal of the Complaint was based in large part on
its conclusion that the Compensation Committee complied with the literal terms
of the Plan. See R. 611 ("All of the February 2014 SSARs grants complied with the
terms of the Plan"); R. 612 ("It is undisputed that the Members of the
Compensation Committee complied with the terms of the Plan when they issued
the February 2014 SSARs"); R. 613 ("The facts alleged in the Complaint confirm
that the Compensation Committee followed the Plan when it granted the
February 2014 SSARs"); R. 615 ("In it [sic] undisputed that the SSARs were
issued at the then-current trading price ... as expressly permitted in the Plan");
id. ("the SSARs were issued consistent with the Plan, at their publicly traded
share price").

Specifically, the Plan required that the exercise price of stock

appreciation rights "shall not be less than 100% of Fair Market Value on the date
of grant," which the Plan defines as the then-current trading price of USANA
common stock. (R. 11). The district court held that because the exercise price of
the SSARs granted on February 3, 2014 was equal to the trading price of the
Company's stock on that date, the Compensation Committee members complied
such that you give yourself assets for less than their fair value, that's classic
breach of the duty of loyalty stuff. So Count III [against the recipients of the
spring-loaded equity awards] certainly states a claim.") Here, as in Weiss and
CytRx, Rawcliffe alleges that the Directors and Officers knew the SSARs were
improperly spring-loaded because they too were aware of the Company's positive
financial results that would undoubtedly cause the trading price to rise once
public. (R. 15, 25-26). Thus, Rawcliffe states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against the Directors and Officers as recipients of the SSARs. Weiss, 948 A.2d at
449; CytRx, Tr. at 41:17-18.
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with the Plan and therefore cannot be held accountable for breach of their
fiduciary duties despite knowing that USANA's stock price would likely increase
significantly the next day once they disclosed the inside information they
possessed at the time they made the grants.
The district court's holding misses entirely the problem with sprmgloading, which is a way for corporate fiduciaries to circumvent a plan's
requirement that equity awards be granted at fair market value by using nonpublic, inside information to manipulate "fair market value" to benefit
themselves. As explained in CytRx:
Basically, what the allegation is, is that the directors
found a way to give themselves dollars for 25 cents. In
other words, the stock at the time, because of the
transformational news that they knew and the
market didn't, had a fair market value far
greater than the $2.39 strike price. Indeed, it
ultimately went up to 7-ish bucks a share. But because
they used the market price where the market did not
know about this information, they were able to price the
options for approximately 25 percent or a third of that.
So they got dollars for 25 cents or 33 cents.
CytRx, Tr. at 40:11-22 (emphasis added).

If the market had the same

information the Directors and Officers had on the day the SSARs were awarded,
the market price would have been significantly higher, as evidenced by the fact
that once the market received the positive information, USANA's stock price
jumped to $68-46. (R. 13). Accordingly, the true "fair market value" of USANA
stock on the day the SSARs were awarded was "far greater" than the $57.62
exercise price, which was based on the price of USANA stock as determined by
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the market without the benefit of the inside information the Directors and
Officers knew. See CytRx, Tr. at 40:13-16. Indeed, as the Court held in CytRx,
once the insiders were in possession of potentially market-moving news, they
were obligated to postpone granting any equity awards until after the market
absorbed the relevant information and the stock price was reflective of the actual
market value. Id. at 38:2-11, 38:18-39:3.
In reaching its conclusion, the district court incorrectly distinguished the
instant action from Tyson and Weiss on the grounds that USANA's Plan required
equity awards to be granted at the then-current trading price. (R. 615). In fact,
in Tyson and Weiss, each of the companies had stockholder-approved equity
incentive plans with provisions requiring the granting of incentive options at the
market value-just like USANA. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575 n.15 (under the
terms of Tyson's stock incentive plan, "[t]he exercise price of an incentive stock
option may not be less than the fair market value of the Class A Common Stock
on the date of the grant"); Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439 (under the terms of Linear's
stockholder-approved option plan, "the per Share exercise price shall be no less
than 100% of the Fair Market Value per Share on the date of the grant" with
"'Fair Market Value' [] defined as the closing bid price for Linear's stock ... on
the date the options are granted"). Even though the options at issue in those
cases were granted with an exercise price equal to the trading price of the
respective company's common stock on the dates of the grants, the courts held
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that the grants violated the spirit and intent of the plans' requirement that the
exercise price be equal to fair market value. As explained in Tyson:
Granting spring-loaded options, without explicit
authorization from shareholders, clearly involves an
indirect deception. A director's duty of loyalty includes
the duty to deal fairly and honestly with the
shareholders for whom he is a fiduciary.
It is
inconsistent with such a duty for a board of directors to
ask for shareholder approval of an incentive stock
option plan and then later to distribute shares to
managers in such a way as to undermine the very
objectives approved by shareholders. This remains
true even if the board complies with the strict
letter of a shareholder-approved plan as it
relates to strike prices or issue dates.

Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592-93 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court
improperly distinguished Weiss and Tyson on this basis. In the instant action,
just like in Tyson and Weiss, although the Compensation Committee complied
with the "strict letter" of the Plan by granting the SSARs at the February 3 trading
price, because the Compensation Committee was in possession of material
nonpublic information that it knew would cause USANA's stock price to rise, the
Compensation Committee "undermine[d] the very objectives" of the Plan. Id.

D.

The Practice of Spring-Loading Is Not Protected by the
Business Judgment Rule

The district court also held that spring-loading is protected by the business
judgment rule.

(R. 612-14).

Delaware courts have expressly rejected this

conclusion. Specifically, in Weiss, the court stated:
Although the defendants are correct that compensation
decisions are typically protected by the business
judgment rule, the rule applies to the directors' grant of
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options pursuant to a stockholder-approved plan only
when the terms of the plan at issue are adhered
to. Thus, as the court held in [Tyson], allegations in a
complaint rebut the business judgment rule where they
support an inference that the directors intended to
violate the terms of stockholder-approved option plans.

Weiss, 948 A.2d at 441-42 (emphasis added). Specifically, "a claim of springloading" successfully "rebut[s] the business judgment rule" if:
(1) the plaintiff establishes that the challenged grants
were given pursuant to an options plan, and (2) the
plaintiff establishes that directors who approved the
grants (a) possessed material non-public information
soon to be released that would affect the company's
share price, and (b) issued options with an intent to
circumvent otherwise valid stockholder-approved
restrictions upon the exercise price of the options.

Id. at 441 n.21 (citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 & n.75). In both Tyson and Weiss,
the courts found that facts identical to those alleged here met the above test, and
accordingly the defendants' conduct was not protected by the business judgment
rule. See Weiss, 948 A.2d at 444; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 593 ("Such allegations ...
satisfy a plaintiffs requirement to show adequately at the pleading stage that a
director acted disloyally and in bad faith and is therefore unable to claim the
protection of the business judgment rule.").
The Compensation Committee members' intent to circumvent the exercise
price restrictions is demonstrated by their historical manipulation of the timing
of equity award grants, by consistently granting equity awards before the release
of information expected to increase the trading price of USANA's stock, and after
the release of information expected to decrease the trading price. (R. 15-16).
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Thus, the Compensation Committee's granting of the spring-loaded SSARs is not
protected by the business judgment rule.
The district court relied on DeSimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch.
2007), to support its holding that the Directors and Officers' conduct was
protected by the business judgment rule.

(R. 613).

However, DeSimone is

distinguishable from the instant case on several grounds. First, in DeSimone the
Delaware Court of Chancery expressly recognized the existence of a "claim of
disloyalty under the theory articulated in Tyson, which is that directors breach
their fiduciary duties if they approve spring-loaded or bullet-dodging options in a
bad faith effort to circumvent stockholder-approved restrictions on the exercise
price of options," id. at 944, but dismissed the complaint because in DeSimone
(unlike in Tyson, Weiss, CytRx, Ausikaitis, and the present action), "belowmarket options were expressly permitted by the Incentive Plan. Therefore,
there were no rigid exercise price restrictions to circumvent." Id. (emphasis
added). 14 The plaintiff in DeSimone also failed to allege that any of the directors
who approved the awards were aware of the forthcoming positive information,
and no such inference could be drawn because the information was released
weeks later and the stock price went down before it went up. Id. at 945. The
court in DeSimone further noted that the challenged options were granted by
disinterested directors, id. at 946, unlike here, where Anciaux, McClain, and
4 The Delaware Court of Chancery specifically rejected DeSimone as "clearly
distinguishable" from the facts at issue in CytRx, which are identical to the facts
in this action. CytRx, Tr. at 39:15-17.
1
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Poelman granted the spring-loaded SSARs to themselves as well as other
recipients, and thus are anything but disinterested. (R. 2, 13-14).15 Indeed, even
if the grants had not been spring-loaded, the Compensation Committee members'
grants of SSARs to themselves would not be protected by the business judgment
rule because they are not disinterested in their own grants. See Telxon Corp. v.

Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 265 (Del. 2002) ("Like any other interested transaction,
directoral self-compensation decisions lie outside the business judgment rule's
presumptive protection"); see also, Calma v. Templeton , 114 A.3d 563, 578 (Del.
Ch. 2015) (holding that a compensation committee's approval of equity awards to
themselves and other directors "were conflicted decisions because all three
members of the Compensation Committee received some of the RSU Awards"
and thus was not protected by the business judgment rule); Valeant Pharm. Int'l

v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 745 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("Where the self-compensation
involves directors or officers paying themselves bonuses, the court is particularly
cognizant to the need for careful scrutiny" and therefore "[s]elf-interested
compensation decisions made without independent protections" are subject to
higher scrutiny under the entire fairness standard as opposed to the deferential
business judgment rule).

In re 3COM Corp. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 25, 1999), on which the district court also relied, (R. 613), did not even
involve allegations of spring-loading, bullet-dodging or similar manipulation of
the timing of equity grants. Rather, the plaintiffs there simply alleged that the
amounts of the equity grants awarded to the defendant directors were excessive.
Accordingly, 3COM is not applicable to the instant case.
1

5

-33-

E.

The Fact that the SSARs Had Not Yet Vested Is Irrelevant

The district court also held that the Complaint failed to state a claim
because the SSARs would not vest until January 2016 for the directors and
August 2016 to August 2017 for the officers. Specifically, the district court stated
that "even in light of allegations that the stock price jumped just after the
February 3, 2014 SSARs were issued, this should not form the basis for a breach
of fiduciary duty or malfeasance claim when the value of the SSARs will be based
on stock values at the dates of potential exercise at least 23 to 42 months later."
(R. 614). This position has also been rejected by Delaware law, which squarely
holds that, "if there is a wrong, it occurs at the moment the stock option is
granted."

Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 267 (Del. Ch. 2007) (emphasis

added).
The defendants in Weiss attempted to argue that the long vesting schedule
of the spring-loaded options was a basis for dismissal, and the court, relying on a
similar holding in Tyson, rejected that argument:
the Tyson court already rejected the defendants'
argument regarding vesting as a basis for granting the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. As
that court noted, "recipients of options are generally
unable to benefit financially from [options] until a
vesting period has elapsed, and thus an option's value to
an executive employee is of less immediate value than
an equivalent grant of cash." ... Nonetheless, the Tyson
court held that such grants may represent a breach of
fiduciary duty....

Weiss, 948 A.2d at 447 (citing Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592 n.75). This holding makes
sense because the value of an option or SSAR is in the difference between the

exercise price of the instrument and the market price of the stock when the
instrument is exercised, and a lower exercise price reduces the amount of price
appreciation necessary for the instrument to be "in the money" regardless of the
vesting schedule. In this case, as a result of their artificially low exercise price,
upon vesting the SSARs could be "in the money" even if USANA's stock price is

lower than it was on February 5, 2014, which would completely defeat the
purpose of stock appreciation rights.
Likewise, the fact that the SSARs have not yet been exercised is of no
consequence. As the Delaware Court of Chancery held in Weiss, "the defendants
retain something of value-the challenged options-at the expense of the
corporation. Nothing suggests that the defendants are prevented from exercising
their options once they fully vest." Id. at 450 (denying motion to dismiss because
"'one can imagine a situation where [the defendants] exercise[] the options and
benefit[] from the low exercise price."' (quoting Ryan, 918 A.2d at 361)). Indeed,
the SSARs, even if not vested, have a monetary value. The Directors and Officers
have the ability to pledge or sell their SSARs even before they vest, and
economists and compensation experts have developed methods for valuing
unvested and unexercised options, such as the Black-Scholes method, which
USANA and other corporations routinely use to value equity awards when
reporting them in the Company's SEC filings. As the CytRx Court explained, the
fact that the defendants had not yet exercised the improperly granted equity
awards was irrelevant to determining whether they had breached their fiduciary
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duties: "Like even guys who rob a bank know how to lay low for a while and not to
go out and spend a bunch of money that would call attention to themselves. I
mean, it's sort oflike shooting up a flare if you do that, isn't it?" CytRx, Tr. 19:1620.
II.

THE COMPLAINT STATES CLAIMS AGAINST THE DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS FOR CORPORATE WASTE AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT

The district court further erred in holding that Rawcliffe's "claims for
corporate waste and unjust enrichment are conclusory" and "without supporting
factual allegations." (R. 616).
To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a
benefit has been conferred on one person by another; (2) the recipient
appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the recipient accepted or
retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
recipient to retain the benefit without payment of its value. See, e.g., Desert

Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, iii! 13-16, 12 P.3d 580.
Complaint easily satisfies these elements.

The

It alleges that the Compensation

Committee caused the Company to confer a benefit-the improperly springloaded SSARs-on the Directors and Officers. (R. 2, 13-15, 26). The Complaint
further alleges that the Directors and Officers had knowledge of this benefit. (R.
12-15, 23, 26). Additionally, the Complaint alleges that it would be inequitable to
allow the Directors and Officers to retain the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 26).
Multiple courts have refused to dismiss unjust enrichment claims against the

recipients of spring-loaded equity awards based on identical allegations. See
CytRx, Tr. at 41:19-42:4; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449-50; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 602-03;
Ausikaitis, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 680; see also, Ryan, 918 A.2d at 361 (refusing to
dismiss unjust enrichment claims against the recipients of backdated stock
options). As discussed above at page 28, the CytRx court explained that the
defendants used the market price of the company's stock-when the market did
not have the "transformational news" that the defendants had-to price the
options for approximately 25-33% of what they would have been priced at had
the market known of the news. CytRx, Tr. at 40:10-22. With respect to the
plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim against the recipients of the stock options, the
CytRx court stated "[w]hen you get dollars for whatever it works out to be, 25
cents, 33 cents, because you priced at the market when you hadn't told the
market about this transformational information, you're unjustly enriching
yourself. So Count IV states a claim." Id. at 41:24-42:4. Likewise, here, the
Directors and Officers received options that should have had an exercise price of
$68-46 but actually had an exercise price of $57.62. Accordingly, the Directors
and Officers were unjustly enriched.
The district court further held that "the Complaint nowhere suggests that
any of the Defendants who received the SSARs did little or no work for USANA or
were otherwise not deserving of compensation for their services" and that the
Directors and Officers were indeed entitled to compensation for their services.
(R. 616). This holding mischaracterizes Rawcliffe's allegations. Rawcliffe does
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not allege that the Directors and Officers were not entitled to receive
compensation for their roles at USANA, nor does he allege that the Directors and
Officers were not entitled to receive SSARs at all. To the contrary, the Complaint
acknowledges that the Plan expressly permits the Compensation Committee to
grant properly priced SSARs and other types of equity awards to eligible
participants. (R. 11). What Rawcliffe alleges, however, is that the Directors and
Officers were not entitled to receive spring-loaded SSARs and that the
Directors and Officers were unjustly enriched by the additional value they
received as a result of the spring-loading, i.e., the $10.84 difference between the
exercise price and the trading price after the market had reacted to the news.

See, e.g., Weiss, 948 A.2d at 449 (explaining that spring-loading "ensures that
the exercise price of a grantee's option is lower than it otherwise would be. Thus,
upon exercise of the option, the grantee receives more value, and the company
less, than he should."). The Compensation Committee members should have
waited to grant the SSARs until after the positive news was released, or "tried to
make a determination about what the fair market value was on that date,
assuming full knowledge by a willing buyer and seller of all material information .

. . ." CytRx Tr. at 38:2-11, 38:18-39:3.
Finally, the Complaint alleges that Anciaux, McClain and Poelman, as
members of the Compensation Committee, wasted the assets of USANA by
granting the spring-loaded SSARs. (R. 25). As the Court explained in CytRx:

Would an ordinary person swap dollars for 25 cents?
No. An ordinary person, if you go up to them and say,
"I've got $5. How about you give me $1," they're not
going to do that deal.
For fiduciaries to say, "Yes, we will do that deal" raises
an inference of waste. That is the type of transaction
that no reasonable person would agree to.
CytRx, Tr. at 40:23-41:6. Rawcliffe does not allege that all grants of SSARs to
the Directors and Officers would necessarily constitute waste, but only that the
grant of spring-loaded SSARs constitutes waste because such grants are
"approved without any valid corporate purpose." Weiss, 948 A.2d at 450. Thus,
under CytRx and Weiss, Rawcliffe has adequately stated a claim for waste against
the Compensation Committee members.
III.

AFFIRMING THE DISTRJCT COURT'S DECISION WOULD BE
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
As stated above, the directors and officers of a Utah corporation "'must

exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions touching their duties to the
corporation and its property"' and must act in the best interests of the
corporation and not for their own personal benefit. Glen Allen Mining, 77 Utah
at 384-85 (quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272). Such directors and officers
'"are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position."' Id. If this
Court affirms the district court's holding, the directors and officers of Utah
corporations will have no disincentive to engage in self-dealing through the
manipulation of the timing of equity awards. Accordingly, the district court's
decision should be reversed in the interests of public policy.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Rawcliffe respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the Amended Memorandum and the Final Judgment and remand
this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of March 2016.
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Addendum A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES ROBERT RA WCLIFFE,
derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant
USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL

v.
ROBERT ANCIAUX a/k/a ROBERT
AUCIUX, JERRY G. MCCLAIN,
RONALD S. POELMAN, JAMES H.
BRAMBLE, JIM BROWN, GILBERT
FULLER, KEVIN G. GUEST, DANIEL A.
MACUGA, DA YID A. WENTZ, and
DEBORAH WOO,

Case No. 140905252
Judge Keith A. Kelly

Defendants,
and
USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC.,
Nominal Defendant.

Before the Com1 is Defendants' October 2, 2014 Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs
Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint ("Complaint"). Plaintiff opposed the Motion on
November 13 , 2014, and Defendants submitted their reply on December 11, 2014. Plaintiff
submitted supplemental authority on January 9, 2015 . The Court heard oral argument on January
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23, 2015, and the Court took this matter under advisement.
After hearing oral argument, the Court has analyzed the written arguments, case law, and
the transcript of oral argument. Based upon these, the Court is convinced that Defendants'
Motion is well taken and issues the following memorandum decision.
The Court issued its original memorandum decision and order on March 18, 2015 in this
matter. To clarify the Court's reasons for granting Defendants' Motion, the Court issues this
amended memorandum decision, which supersedes the original memorandum decision.
Legal Standard on This Motion to Dismiss
This Motion to Dismiss focuses on the allegations of the Complaint. Defendants'
principal arguments are brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides that the Court
"may dismiss an action if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Osguth01pe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C ., 2010 UT 29,

~

20, 232 P.3d 999 (internal quotations

omitted). A motion brought under Rule l 2(b )(6) '"admits the facts alleged in the complaint but
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those facts."' Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009
UT 11, ~ 14, 203 P.3d 962 (quoting Oakwood Vil!. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ~ 8,
104P.3d 1226).
In considering a Rule l 2(b) Motion, this Court accepts the non-conclusory factual
allegations of the Complaint as true, but is not bound to accept conclusory statements that are
unsupported by underlying factual allegations. Affirming dismissal of conclus01y claims of fraud
and breach of fiduciaiy duty, the Utah Court of Appeals recently explained:
The sufficiency of the pleadings within a complaint 'must be determined by the facts
pleaded rather than the conclusions stated.' Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 2001 UT 25, ~ 26, 21 P.3d 198 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Foster v. Saunders, 2005 UT App 264, at para. 3, 2005 WL 1356799 (per
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curiam). Here, [plaintiff's] complaint asserts that [defendants] breached their fiduciary
duties to [plaintiff]. But the complaint does not allege any act [defendant] performed in
furtherance of those breaches. [Plaintiff's] complaint claims only that [defendant]
'actively participated ' in the breach. This allegation is purely conclusory rather than
factual and is therefore insufficient to support a claim for relief. See Chapman v. Primmy
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989) (' We have stressed, and continue to
hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of
relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment.').
Accordingly, dismissal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
was appropriate.

Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, iJ 23 , 344 P.3d 156. In light of
this authority, the Court examines the factual allegations of the Complaint - rather than
conclusory labels - in determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim.
Plaintiff's allegations of option spring loading are fraud-based claims of " manipulating
the granting of equity awards." (See Complaint iii! 45, 75-78 & 83-86.) Counsel for Plaintiff
expressed this point in oral argument: "This is not a negligence case. We alleged bad faith. We
allege intentional misconduct." (Transcript of Oral Argument ( 1/23/15) at p. 45 ("Argument
Transcript" ).)
Because allegations of option spring-loading sound in fraud , Plaintiff is required to plead
his breach of fiduciary duty claims (I st and

J rd

claims) with the specificity required by Rule 9(b ).

See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) (" In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."). Rule 9(b) " is not limited to allegations of
common law fraud" but instead reaches "all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term ' fraud ' in its broadest
dimension." State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, iJ 22, 282 P.3d 66 (applying heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9(b) to plaintiff's claims under Utah False Claims Act) (internal citations and
emphasis omitted).
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This heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims for waste of
corporate assets and unjust enrichment (2"<l and 4°1 claims) to the extent that those claims are not
based upon allegations of fraudulent option spring loading.
At oral argument, both sides agreed that, in addition to considering the allegations of the
Complaint, the Court may take judicial notice of public documents such as SEC filings, as well
as documents referenced in the Complaint, without converting this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Argument Transcript at pp. I 0 & 27;

EMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64,

~~

6-7, 322 P.3d 1172 (court could take judicial notice

of document which was public record and also consider it as implicitly referenced in complaint);

Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004UT101,

~

13 , 104 P.3d 1226 (same).

Claims Made in the Complaint
Plaintiff filed the shareholder derivative Complaint on behalf of nominal defendant
USANA Health Sciences, Inc. (" USANA" or the "Company" ) against certain of USANA ' s
executive officers and members of its Board of Directors (collectively " Individual Defendants).
The Complaint claims that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty, wasted corporate assets
and obtained unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that, in breach of their fiduciary duties
owed to USANA, the members of the Board ' s Compensation Committee (the "Compensation
Committee") knowingly and deliberately violated USANA ' s stockholder-approved equity plan,
the USANA Health Sciences, Inc. 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan (the " Plan"), a copy of
which was attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. Specifically, the Complaint claims that the
Compensation Committee knowingly and deliberately granted to themselves and other directors
and officers of USANA a total of 309,483 stock-settled stock appreciation rights (" SSARs") that
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were "spring-loaded," in other words, granted just prior to the release of material information
reasonably expected to drive the market price of the Company' s stock higher, thereby artificially
increasing the value of the SSARs by establishing an artificially low exercise price. (Complaint

iii! 1-3 .)
The Complaint claims that the Compensation Committee granted the spring-loaded
SSARs on February 3, 2014, when they knew that USANA was about to announce impressive
financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 28, 2013 . These results were
announced in a press release issued the very next day, February 4, 2014, after the market closed.
The results had a favorable effect on USANA ' s stock price, which increased by 15 .8% the next
day. Plaintiff claims that the timing of the SSARs on February 3rd was perfectly orchestrated to
"spring-load" the grants in order to capitalize on the market's expected positive reaction to
USANA's news. The Complaint asserts that Compensation Committee' s award of the springloaded SSARs to themselves and other recipients constituted a waste of corporate assets and a
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by the Compensation Committee to USANA and its
stockholders, as well as unjust enrichment of and breach of fiduciary duty by the Individual
Defendants. (Id.

iii! 4-6, 23-43, 75-90.)

The Complaint seeks rescission of the SSARs or, alternatively, to recover damages for
the benefit of USANA and to compel the Individual Defendants to disgorge to USANA the
benefits they have received from their SSARs. (Id.

iii! 75-90 &

A-E.)
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The USANA Equity Incentive Award Plan
In analyzing these claims, the Court considers the undisputed factual allegations
concerning the issuance of the SSARs. In April 2006, USANA's shareholders adopted USANA's
25-page Equity Incentive Award Plan (the "Plan") to govern the particulars ofUSANA's use of
stock and other equity instruments in compensating and creating incentives for the Company's
high-level personnel. (Complaint iii! 27, 28 & Exhibit A.) The Plan contemplates that USANA
will use these incentive awards to attract highly desirable candidates as employees by
maintaining "competitive compensation levels." (Id., Ex. A (Plan), at A-1.) It further provides
that incentive awards will be used to retain talent by providing "an incentive to management and
employees to remain in continuing employment with the Company." (Id.) The Plan contemplates
that incentive awards will be used to "[ c] losely associate the interests of management,
employees, directors and consultants . . . with the shareholders by reinforcing the relationship
between participants' rewards and shareholder gains." (Id.) The Plan is thus structured to
"[p ]rovide an incentive to management and employees ... to put forth maximum efforts for the
success of its business." (Id.)
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-624 ( 1992), the Plan grants extensive powers to the
Committee to administer the Plan and issue awards pursuant to its terms. (Complaint, Ex. A
(Plan) at A-18 .) The Committee has "the exclusive power, authority and discretion" to make all
key decisions about awards. (Id. at A-19.) This discretion covers "the terms and conditions of
any Award granted pursuant to the Plan, including, but not limited to, the exercise price, grant
price or purchase price, any reload provision, [and] any restrictions or limitations on the Award."

(Id.) The Plan also allows the Committee to "[d]ecide all other matters that must be determined
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in connection with an Award." (Id. at A-20.)
The Plan provides that the exercise price of incentive awards must be no less than the fair
market value of the Company' s shares at the time of the grant. (Id. at A-10 (requiring that stock
appreciation rights be granted at a price " no less than 100% of the Fair Market Value on the date
of grant").) Absent some contrary determination made by the Committee, the fair market value
for publicly traded stock "shall be .. . the mean between the highest and lowest selling price of a
share of Common Stock on the principal exchange on which shares of Common Stock are then
trading, if any, on that date, or if shares were not traded on such date, then on the closest
preceding date on which a trade occurred . .. ." (Id. at A-3 (defining "Fair Market Value").)
The Plan authorizes the use of various equity-based incentive awards, (Complaint ii 30),
including stock appreciation rights ("SARs"). Such rights, when exercised, entitle the holder to
receive the difference between the selected exercise price, which is based on the Company' s
stock price at the time of issuance, and the trading price of the Company' s stock on the exercise
date. (Id. ii 31 .) SARs are non-transferable and have no intrinsic monetary value prior to vesting.
(See id. , Ex. A at A-15, part 10.3 .) SARs are distinct from more traditional "stock options" in
that they do not require the recipient to pay an exercise price, but instead involve the issuance of
stock or cash to the employee reflecting the difference between the SARs' issuance price and
exercise price. When SARs are "in the money," the share price on the day of exercise exceeds
the pre-set exercise price. Thus, the SA Rs ' payoff is a function of the Company' s stock price.
Out-of-the-money SARs return no value to an exercising party.
Issuance of the February 2014 SSARs
The SARs in question are a form of stock appreciation rights known as SSARs. SSARs
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are stock appreciation rights that pay the appreciation amount in stock rather than cash. SSARs
cannot be exercised until they vest.
On February 3, 2014, the Committee granted SSARs to certain senior executives, each of
whom is named as an Individual Defendant in this action. (Complaint if 40.) Under the grants,
the six Officer Defendants received between 32,500 and 58,500 SSARs, half of which were set
to vest in August 2016, and half of which were set to vest in August 2017. (See id.; Malcolm
Affidavit to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Exs. C - L (February 6, 2014 Form 4s for the
Individual Defendants ("Form 4s") 1).) The Committee also granted 12,000 SSARs each to the
four Director Defendants, which were set to vest quarterly beginning in January 2016. (Id.) Thus,
on their face, the SSARs would vest and provide value about 23 to 42 months after they were
issued.
Even though the Complaint references USANA's prior grants of SARs, the allegations in
the Complaint that form the basis for the claims in this case are claims related to the February 3,
2014 SSARs. (Complaint iii! 42-43 & 59.)
All of the February 2014 SSARs grants complied with the terms of the Plan. Indeed,
Plaintiffs counsel explained at oral argument that "the compensation committee complied with
the letter of the plan. They granted the SSARs at the exercised - at the stock price on the day of
the grant. So the letter of the plan they met." (Argument Transcript at p. 32.)
The day after the Committee granted these awards, on February 4, 2014, USANA
announced positive results for 2013. (Complaint iii! 34-38.) The Company's stock price rose the
day after to a closing price of $68.46. (Id.

if 39.) The issued SSARs were not vested, however,

These SEC filings are public documents whose existence and content are undisputed. Thus, the Court takes
judicial notice of these undisputed filings without converting this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment.
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and would not vest for 23 to 42 months. (See Form 4s.) There is no allegation that this short-term
stock price increase would guarantee or translate into long-term value for the SSARs. Under the
terms of the Plan, those SSARs would only have value ifthe overall performance of USANA
over the vesting period led to a sustained share price increase.
Significantly, USANA filed Form 4s on February 6, 2014, fully disclosing the issuance of
the SSARs just three days after they were issued. (Id.) There is no allegation that the Defendants
hid or otherwise covered up the issuance of the SSA Rs.
Plaintiff's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Fail Because
the Compensation Committee Undisputedly Complied with the Terms of the Plan
It is undisputed that the Members of the Compensation Committee complied with the

terms of the Plan when they issued the February 2014 SSARs . Thus their actions are protected
by the business judgment rule, and they did not breach their fiduciary duties.
The Committee members' conduct regarding the SSARs grants is governed by the
business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, courts have "provided directors with
broad discretion" and " have been reluctant to make hindsight judgments about corporate affairs."
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (D. Utah 1993); see also FMA
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979) (requiring directors to
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence in administering the affairs of the corporation). In
shielding directors from liability absent some basis for concluding that they acted willfully or
with gross negligence, the Utah Code protects the actions of directors acting in good faith and
with reasonable care. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-840(4) (1993); see also C & Y Corp. v. Gen.
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (identifying the Utah corporate statute as
"codifying [the] business judgment rule").
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Courts have held that "director transactions made under a stock option plan approved by
the corporate shareholders are entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule." In re 3COM
C01p. S 'holders Litig. , 1999 WL 1009210, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (granting motion to

dismiss); see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding no claim
where directors followed "terms of .. . stockholder-approved option plan'').
In this case, it is undisputed that USANA's shareholders adopted the Plan authorizing the
Company to issue equity based incentive awards and to define the terms of such grants.
(Complaint ii 27.) The facts alleged in the Complaint confirm that the Compensation Committee
followed the Plan when it granted the February 2014 SSARs. The Plan specifically directs that
SSARs granted under the Plan must have an exercise price that shall "not be less than 100% of
Fair Market Value on the date of the grant." (Id. ii 32.) This exercise price is to be the "thencurrent trading price" of USANA's stock. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that the Company granted
the SSARs at issue on February 3, 2014. (Id.

ii 40.) On February 3, 2014, the SSARs were issued

with an exercise price of $57.62, the price ofUSANA' s stock on the day of the grant. (Id.) The
Committee therefore followed the shareholders' instructions in exercising the "exclusive power,
authority and discretion" that shareholders gave them to set the terms of SSARs grants. (Plan at
A-19.) Then, in three days, on February 6, 2014, USANA fully disclosed the issuance of the
SSARs. (Form 4s.) Thus Plaintiff's counsel admitted during oral argument that "the
compensation committee complied with the letter of the plan." (Argument Transcript at p. 32.)
Nothing in the Utah corporate code prohibits a compensation committee from granting
incentive compensation before announcing positive financial results. USANA ' s shareholders did
not impose any such limitation in the Plan; nor is there a provision in USANA ' s corporate
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charter or bylaws that would prevent such an award . No other shareholder-imposed restriction
governs the timing of SSARs awards. In all, there is nothing in Utah law or USANA' s corporate
documents that would have given the Compensation Committee members any grounds to believe
that they could be held personally liable for granting options before announcing earnings. To the
contrary, the Plan gives the Compensation Committee broad discretion in issuing SSARs and
expressly states: "No member of the Board or [Compensation] Committee shall be liable for any
action taken or decision or determination made in good faith with respect to any Option, the
Plan, or any award thereunder." (Complaint, Ex. A (Plan) at A-20, part 12.9.)
Further, under their terms, the Officer Defendants' SSARs will not vest until August
2016 and August 2017, while the Director Defendants' SSARs will not vest until January 2016.

(See Form 4s.) These long vesting periods mean that the short-term jump in share price
immediately after issuance of the SSARs will only bring value to the Defendants if the
Company' s positive performance is sustained for 23 to 42 months. Thus, the Court concludes
that, even in light of allegations that the stock price jumped just after the February 3, 2014
SSARs were issued, this should not form the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty or malfeasance
claim when the value of the SSARs will be based on stock values at the dates of potential
exercise at least 23 to 42 months later.
Pla intiff cites cases in which trial courts have denied motions to dismiss breach of
fiduciary duty claims that were based upon alleged spring loading of stock options. E.g., Weiss v.

Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 441-48 (Del Ch. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of
fiduciary duty by approving spring-loaded stock options); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol.

Shareholder Litigation, 919 A.2d 563 , 592-93 (Del Ch. 2007) (same). The Tyson court held that
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a claim of spring-loading rebutted the business judgment rule if (I) the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged grants were given pursuant to an options plan, and (2) the plaintiff alleges that
persons who approved the spring-loaded grants "(a) possessed material non-public information
soon to be released that would affect the company's share price, and (b) issued those options with
the intent to circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the exercise
price of the options." 919 A.2d at 592 & n.75 ; see also Weiss, 948 A.2d at 441-42 & n.21.
The test in Tyson and Weiss should not bar dismissal in this case. The USANA Plan
specifically directs that SSARs granted under the Plan must have an exercise price that shall " not
be less than 100% of Fair Market Value on the date of the grant," which is defined to be "the
then-current trading price" of USANA ' s stock. (Complaint~ 32.) In it undisputed that the
SSARs were issued at the then-current trading price (id.

~

40) - as expressly permitted in the

Plan. Since the SSARs were undisputedly issued consistent with this express provision, their
issuance cannot be viewed as circumventing valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the
exercise price of the SSARs. Thus, Plaintiff does not state a claim under the Tyson and Weiss test
even in light of allegations that the Compensation Committee possessed material non-public
information soon to be released that would affect USANA's share price.
Further, Tyson, Weiss and the other trial court cases cited by Plaintiff are not binding on
this Court. Those cases are not persuasive to the extent that they may be read to allow claims in
circumstances such as those in the present case, where the undisputed facts show: (i) the SSARs
were issued consistent with the Plan, at their publicly traded share price; (ii) their terms were
publicly disclosed three days later in the Form 4s; and (iii) the SSARs could not be exercised for
at least 23 to 42 months after they were issued .
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As a result, this Court holds that the business judgment rule bars Plaintiffs breach of
fiduciary duty claims as a matter of law under the undisputed factual allegations of this case.
The Conclusory Corporate Waste and Unjust Enrichment
Allegations Fail to State a Claim
Plaintiffs claims for corporate waste and urtjust enrichment are conclusory. Plaintiff
labels the SSARs as "spring loaded" and then alleges - without supporting factual allegations that those SSARs were provided for inadequate consideration and without valid corporate
purpose, and that keeping them would be unjust and unconscionable. (Complaint iii! 80-81 & 88-

89.)
As discussed above, the label "spring loaded" does not raise a claim under the undisputed
facts of this case. At the same time, the Complaint nowhere suggests that any of the Defendants
who received the SSARs did little or no work for USANA or were otherwise not deserving of
compensation for their services. To the contrary, the Complaint makes clear that each of the
Individual Defendants had substantial responsibilities and duties to perform at USANA, (id.

iii! 12-21, 23-24 ), and that, under their watch, USA NA had outstanding financial
(id.

performance,

iii! 34-3 8). Without facts (not conclusory allegations) supporting claims of corporate waste

and unjust enrichment, and in light of the analysis of the " spring loading" claims discussed
above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state claims for corporate waste and urtjust
enrichment. 2
FINAL JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Final judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Robert Anciaux a/k/a Robert

2
In light of the preceding analysis, the Couit does not reach other arguments raised by Defendants in
support of their Motion to Dismiss.
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Auciaux, Jen-y G. McClain, Ronald S. Poelman, James H. Bramble, Jim Brown, Gilbert Fuller,
Kevin G. Guest, Daniel A. Macuga, David A. Wentz, and Deborah Woo, dismissing all of
Plaintiff's causes of action;
2.

This action is hereby dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice;

3.

Defendants shall submit to the Court and serve upon Plaintiff an appropriate

memorandum of costs within fourteen days of entry of this Judgment and consistent with the
procedures set forth in Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In accordance with the Utah R. Civ. P. lO(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten
signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper right-hand
corner of the first page of this Order.
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Return of Electronic Notification

Recipients
ALAN S MOURITSEN - Notification received on 2015-04-03 17:38:14.073 .
ERIK A - Notification received on 2015-04-03 17:38:13.277.
CHRISTIANSEN
J RYAN MITCHELL - Notification received on 2015-04-03 17:38:13.217.
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FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF UT J\ttAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 1 - 2015

--00000----

JAMES ROBERT RA WCLIFFE,
Appellant,

v.
ROBERT ANCIAUX; JERRY G. MCCLAIN;
RONALD POELMAN; and DEBORAH woo,
Appellees,

ORDER
Appellate Case No. 20150365-SC

USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC.,
Appellee.

--ooOoo-This Court has elected to retain the above-entitled appeal on its docket.
The prior order of transfer to the Court of Appeals is vacated; however, the Court
retains its discretion to transfer the appeal at a later time if circumstances
warrant. Unless otherwise notified, the parties shall file all future pleadings in
the Supreme Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Associate Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 2, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
deposited in the United States mail or was sent by electronic mail to be delivered to:
ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN
ALAN S. MOURITSEN
EChristiansen@parsonsbehle.com
amouritsen@parsonsbehle.com

J. RYAN MITCHELL
STEVEN J. JOFFEE
rmitchell@mbmlawyers.com
sjoffee@mbmlawyers.com
ERIC L. ZAGAR
ROBIN WINCHESTER
KRISTEN L ROSS
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
280 KING OF PRUSIA RD
RADNOR PA 19087
DOUGLAS A. RAPPAPORT
CHRISTOPHER M. EGLESON
LUCY C MALCOLM
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
ONE BRYANT PARK
NEW YORK NY 10036
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JULIE RIGBY AND CHERYL AIONO
cheryla@utcourts.gov, julier@utcourts.gov

Susan Willis
Judicial Services Manager
Case No. 20150365
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 140905252
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J. Ryan Mitchell (9362)
Steven J. Jaffee (13258)

MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C.
Boston Building
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888
Fax: (801) 998-8077
E-mail: RMitchell@mbmlawyers.com
SJoffee@mbmlawyers.com

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
JAMES ROBERT RAWCLIFFE,
)
Derivatively on Behalf of Nominal
)
Defendant USANA HEALTH SCIENCES,
) APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM
INC.,
) ADDRESSING SUPREME COURT'S
) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
. Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
) Case No. 20150365-SC
v.
)
ROBERT ANCIAUX a/k/a ROBERT
) Dist. Ct. No. 140905252
AUCIAUX, JERRY G. MCCLAIN,
)
RONALD S. POELMAN, JANIES H.
)
BRAMBLE, nM BROWN, GILBERT
FULLER, KEVIN G. GUEST, DANIEL A. )
MACUGA, DAVID A. WENTZ and
)
DEBORAH WOO,
)
)
Defendants/Appellees, )
)
and
)
)
USANA HEALTH SCIENCES, INC.,
)
Nominal Defendant/
Appellee.

)

Appellant James Robert Rawcliffe ("Appellant"), by and through his undersigned
counsel of record, hereby submits the following memorandum addressing the Court's
jurisdiction over this appeal as requested by the Court in its July 22, 2015 Order (the
"Order").
In its Order, the Court informed the parties that it was considering, sua sponte,
whether it must dismiss this appeal because it lacks appellate jurisdiction. Specifically,
the Court questioned whether the district court's April 3, 2015 Amended Memorandum
Decision and Final Judgment of Dismissal (the "Final Judgment of Dismissal") was a
final, appealable order under Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
invited the parties to address this issue and explain why the appeal should or should not
be dismissed. · Although Appellant believes the language employed by the district court
demonstrates clearly that it intended its Final Judgment of Dismissal to be a final,
appealable order, Appellant concedes the Final Judgment of Dismissal is technically not
final under Rule 7(f)(2) in light of this Court's decision in Central Utah Water
Conservancy District v. King, 2013 UT 13, 297 P .3 d 619. In King, the Court held that "a
district court that intends its ruling to represent its final, appealable order must explicitly
state that no additional order is necessary" otherwise its decision is not final or appealable
under Rule 7(f)(2). Id.ii ii 24-25 .
.Measured against the King decision'.s strict,

bright-li~e

standard, the Fi.nal

Judgment of Dismissal falls short because although the district court designated its

decision as a final judgment and explicitly stated "that final judgment is entered in favor
of Defendants ... dismissing all of Plaintiffs causes of action," it did not explicitly state
that no additional order was necessary and it did not include any directive for the
preparation of a final version of the decision. Because the district court's Final Judgment
of Dismissal fails to include the explicit language required by the King decision, this
appeal is not ripe because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. 1 Appellant
therefore respectfully requests that its appeal be dismissed without prejudice for lack of
appellate jurisdiction and remanded to the district court with directions to enter a final,
appealable order in accordance with Rule 7(f)(2).ofthe Rules of Civil Procedure .

. DATED this 51h day of August, 2015.

1

Appellant is aware that on May 12, 2015, the Supreme Court adopted amendments to
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that will do away with the strict, bright-line
standard mandated by the current version of rule 7(f)(2) and the Court's decision in King.
Under the amended Rule 7, the district court's Final Judgment of Dismissal would satisfy
the necessary requirements of a final, appealable order removing any question as to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction over this appeal. And while Appellant believes judicial
efficiency and economy would best be s~rved by analyzing Vl'.hether .the Final Judgment
of Dismissal is a final, appealable order against the requirements of the amended Rule 7,
Appellant understands that the amendments do not become effective until November 1,
2015. Accordingly, unless the Court decides to send its King decision into early
retirement, the decision remains controlling precedent.
-2-

MITCHELL BARLOW
&MANSFIELD P.C.
J. Ryan Mitch (936 )
Steven J. Jo ee (13258)
Boston Building
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888
Fax: (801) 998-8077
E-mail: RMitchell@mbmlawyers.com
SJoffee@mbmlawyers.com

KESSLER TOPAZ
MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
Eric L. Zagar
Robin Winchester
Kristen L. Ross
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
Telephone: (610) 667-7706
Fax: (267) 948-2512
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5111 day of August, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM ADDRESSING SUPREME COURT'S
APPELLATE JURISDICTION to be served via US Mail, first class postage prepaid, upon the
following:
Erik A. Christiansen, USB 73 72
Alan S. Mouritsen, USB 13558
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel: 801.532.1234 /Fax: 801.536.6111
EChristiansen@parsonsbehle.com
AMouritsen@parsonsbehle.com
Douglas A. Rappaport (admitted pro hac vice)
Lucy C. Malcolm (admitted pro hac vice)
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
One Bryant Park, New York, NY 10036
Tel: 212.872.1000 I Fax: 212.872.1002
DARappaport@akingump.com
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN RE CYTRX CORP.
STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

CONSOLIDATED
C.A. No. 9864-VCL

Chancery Courtroom No. 12C
New Castle County Courthouse
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware
Thursday, January 8, 2015
11:00 a.m.

BEFORE:

HON.

J.

TRAVIS LASTER,

Vice Chancellor

ORAL ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STAY OR DISMISS
AND THE COURT'S RULINGS

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 255-0521
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SARAH R. MARTIN, ESQ.
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for Defendants
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1

THE COURT:

2

ALL COUNSEL:

3

Good morning,

Your

THE COURT:

Mr.

Welch,

MR.

I'm well,

good morning.

How are you?

6

7

everyone.

Honor.

4
5

Welcome,

WELCH:

Your Honor.

Thank you.
If I might,

8

I'd appreciate the

9

opportunity to introduce to the Court my partner and

10

friend Allen Lanstra from our Los Angeles office who

11

will be making the argument to the Court,

12

Court's permission.

13

THE COURT:

14

East Coast.

15

weather for you.

Great.

with the

Welcome to the

I'm sorry we don't have much better

16

MR.

WELCH:

17

MR.

DELEEUW:

Brad deLeeuw,

Thank you,

Your Honor.

Good morning,

18

Your Honor.

19

Goddess on behalf of plaintiffs.

20

introduce my co-counsel seated at counsel table.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR.

Rosenthal Monhait &
I'd just like to

Sure.

DELEEUW:

Robin Winchester of

23

Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check,

24

Abraham Fruchter & Twersky,

Philip Taylor of

and we also have Kevin

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

0516

4

1

Davenport from the Prickett firm.

2
3

THE COURT:

Great.

Welcome to all of

you.
MR.

4

Ms.

DELEEUW:

With Your Honor's

5

permission,

Winchester will handle the argument on

6

the motion to dismiss today,

7

handle the argument on the motion to stay.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR.

DELEEUW:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR.

12

Honor.

LANSTRA:

and Mr.

Taylor will

That's fine.
Thank you,

Your Honor.

Please go ahead.
Good morning again,

Your

I'd like to start with the motion to stay.

13

There's a factual overlap between the

14

allegations in the securities action in California and

15

the derivative action here.

16

require both cases to call for the determination of

17

questions of fact concerning both spring-loaded stock

18

options and the stock promotions through the

19

DreamTeamGroup.

20

cases simultaneously,

21

corporation.

22

The factual allegations

The prosecution of both of those
we believe,

will prejudice the

While the derivative plaintiffs will

23

be seeking answers to questions on behalf of the

24

corporation,

the securities plaintiffs will be seeking
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

answers against the corporation.

2

attempting to undermine the credibility of witnesses

3

and the other relying on the veracity of those

4

witnesses.

One will be

The derivative action here,

5

if it were

6

to go forward simultaneously,

could result in an

7

imputation of liability of the officers to the

8

corporation in the securities action.

9

I want to make clear,

as everyone

10

reads the briefs and comes back out to argue the

11

cases,

12

plaintiffs believe we are asking the Court to delete

13

this case.

We are not asking for the Court to delete

14

this case.

We're asking just to hit the pause button

15

and allow the securities action to go forward.

I picked up perhaps the suggestion that the

16

We think there's good reasons why the

17

securities action should be the one that goes forward

18

as opposed to the derivative action.

19

action is broader.

20

of a broad scheme that sweeps into it allegations of

21

not only the spring-loading of the stock option grants

22

but the stock promotion.

23

24

The securities

It is setting forth an allegation

They're arguing that there's an
artificial inflation of the stock,

i t ' s related to a

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

secondary offering,

2

officers are attempting to capitalize on it.

3

plaintiff there has allegedly over a million dollars

4

in losses so he's a real plaintiff,

5

be obligated or certainly interested in pushing

6

forward with all might.

7

and that the directors and the
The lead

and he's going to

There's a broader range of dates

8

involved in California as well.

Depending on who

9

characterizes the derivative complaint here,

we could
We

10

be talking about a window of three days of events.

11

could also be arguing from about October all the way

12

until about March.

13

the allegations of spring-loading and the DreamTeam

14

are all combined or a part of the securities action in

15

California.

16

I

That range is within the range and

think,

in short,

both cases will

17

call for the determination of substantially the same

18

questions of fact,

19

only a conflict that will prejudice the corporation

20

but will also be a waste of resources,

21

opinion.

and we think that that causes not

I

think,

22

I don't know if you have any

23

THE COURT:

24

in our

Remind me of the status of

the federal action.
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MR.

1

LANSTRA:

The defendants have

2

moved to dismiss,

3

complete.

I

4

February.

There are derivative cases as well.

5

I'm not sure how much i t ' s set forth in the briefs,

6

but there were three cases in Delaware or in

7

California that were filed derivatively.

That briefing is not

believe the briefing will be complete in

One of them,

8
9

Your Honor.

And

we were able to convince

the plaintiff to withdraw the case and dismiss it

10

based on a forum selection clause because we believe

11

that the derivative cases should be handled here when

12

they're taken care of.
And the other two cases,

13

handled by

14

the same counsel,

they don't agree with the forum

15

selection clause,

so they're fighting it out.

16

has been fully briefed before Chief Judge King in the

17

Central District.

18

oral argument,

19

day.

20

That

He has indicated he will not take

so the opinion on that could come any

To be clear,

we believe that this is
We have moved in the

21

the place for those cases.

22

alternative for a stay of the California derivative

23

cases for this action as well as a stay for the class.

24

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.
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1
2

Do you want to go ahead and address
the other motions or take them one by one?

3

I guess since they're splitting it up,

4

why don't we focus on the stay for now,

5

you back.

6
7

LANSTRA:

MR.

TAYLOR:

Certainly.

Thank you,

Your Honor.

8

9

MR.

and I ' l l have

Philip Taylor.

Good morning,

I think I ' l l

Your Honor.

just address first the

10

factual overlap that the defendants speak of.

11

this Court addressed in the Molycorp litigation that

12

the factual overlap between a federal and a derivative

13

case shouldn't cause a stay to be put in place here in

14

Delaware.

15

I

think

I think Vice Chancellor Noble said

16

that "It's almost foreseeable that directors of

17

Delaware corporations might be called to defend both

18

securities and derivative actions based on the same

19

factual basis."

20

So we really don't believe that this

21

factual overlap should cause a stay.

22

especially true because the claims,

23

are quintessentially Delaware claims.

24

action is really Delaware,

And that is
we believe,

here

The meat of our

Delaware claims,

whereas
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1

the federal claims are disclosure-based claims.

2

look at the Delaware fiduciaries -- excuse me -- the

3

compensation practices of Delaware fiduciaries.

4

these have been described as questions of great import

5

to Delaware law.
As defendants point out,

6

We're

And

they have a

7

Delaware forum selection clause which requires all

8

such types of actions,

9

Delaware.

claims,

to be brought here in

They agreed that the claims should be

10

litigated here in Delaware.

And,

really,

the only

11

prejudice that's going to be suffered is by delaying

12

plaintiffs'

litigation of these claims.
There's no indemnity claims pled in

13

14

our case,

so there's no practical considerations to

15

hold off litigating the claims because of how the

16

federal

securities litigation turns out.

17

The other practical considerations

18

with respect to the facts that are going to be

19

developed in this case,

20

they're concerned about,

21

220 documents.

22

practical considerations in terms of overlapping

23

discovery.

24

a lot of the key facts that
we've already obtained in the

So I don't think that there's any

We actually were the first plaintiffs
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1

to assert the spring-loading claim,

2

spring-loading claims only came up in the federal

3

securities actions after they were asserted here in

4

Delaware.

5

so the

And the DreamTeam and stock promotion

6

claims,

they're pled in our complaint as background

7

simply to show further evidence of defendants'

8

of dishonesty to shareholders.

9
10

THE COURT:

Do you really need me to

get into any of that?

11
12

history

MR.
really up to you,

13

TAYLOR:

Well,

I

guess that's

Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Well,

it's up to you

14

because you're going to be the one who,

15

forward,

16

thing.

17

there's this bigger scheme concept out in California

18

about pumping up stock,

19

be exploring things about that or asking me to make

20

rulings on things like that?

21

if this goes

is conducting discovery and that sort of
I mean,

part of what your friend says is that

MR.

et cetera.

TAYLOR:

Are you going to

Your Honor,

our claims

22

are really based on the spring-loading of the options,

23

so those facts are really minor,

24

background facts.

like I

said,

Our focus here is on the
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1

spring-loading.

2

facts

3

the spring-loading happened,

4

we're going to need any -- I don't want to say we're

5

not going to need any rulings on those facts,

6

certainly they're very minor,

7

is really the meat of our case.

can kind of elucidate the environment in which

THE COURT:

8
9

So to the extent that the background

sure,

but I don't think

but

and the spring-loading

It seems to me that the

pumping is a different question.

I mean,

actually,

10

your point is that the stock price on the date that

11

these grants were made wasn't pumped.

12

And if you show pumping,

it actually

13

decreases your damages claim because then there was --

14

so whatever the value of the stock was thought to be,

15

then there's the actual v alue of the stock,

16

was known by the directors about this Phase 2 result.

17

You want the delta between those two things.

18

the market price out there was higher because of

19

pumping,

20

closer to what it should have been had there been full

21

disclosure,

actually,

given what

And if

that would get the market price

in your view.

22

So if you get into that stuff,

23

start saying,

"Oh,

24

price," or whatever,

if you

DreamTeam was pumping up the
you'd ironically be decreasing
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1

your damages claim in terms what you could get in

2

front of me.

3

of the Delaware matter,

4

stuff.

So it doesn't seem to me like,

MR.

5

in terms

you really want to touch that

TAYLOR:

Like I

said,

it's

6

certainly a minor part of our claims,

7

the damages on the spring-loading options that we're

8

going towards here in Delaware.
So the factual

9

and i t ' s really

overlap,

I mean,

it's

10

like two ships passing in the night.

It's really --

11

i t ' s of no consequence to litigating our claims here

12

in Delaware.

13

practical reason,

14

favor of the federal

15

And,

And there's really no reason,

no

to stay the Delaware litigation in
securities case.
I mean,

as they pointed out,

they

16

believe that these claims should be litigated here in

17

Delaware,

18

delay important issues of Delaware law for

19

securities case that hasn't even completed briefing

20

yet.

21

March on the motion to dismiss briefing,

22

has taken under advisement other issues in the federal

23

derivative cases.

24

I

and there is no reason for this Court to
a

believe the hearing is set for sometime in
and the Court

So --

THE COURT:

What bad things could
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1

happen if I waited?

2

MR.

TAYLOR:

Well,

I mean,

there's

3

always the risk -- well,

4

want to lock us into a position,

5

that the Court could make a decision on issues of

6

Delaware law where it's more -- I mean,

7

this Court would be better placed to make those

8

decisions.

9

I don't want to -- I don't
but there is

~

risk

it seems that

The motion to dismiss has been

10

briefed,

and the Court,

like I

said,

has taken it

11

under advisement.

12

does rule on the issues of demand futility,

13

obviously,

14

believe that those issues should -- are better decided

15

in this Court.

16

could --

So to the extent that the Court
I mean,

we think that -- and defendants also

17

So I think to the extent that we

THE COURT:
"You know What?

Let's say that I

just

18

said,

California is likely to,

19

goes forward,

20

some of this stuff,

21

I ' l l have more leisure,

22

some of the other cases that Mr.

23

front of me and that we have together if I

24

back and let California deal with these things.

if it

come out with some factual answers on
and I'm a utility-maximizing guy.
more opportunity,

to deal with

Welch has brought in
just kick
And
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1

then when California comes out with some findings

2

fact about what the directors knew or didn't know and

3

what the market knew or didn't know,

4

those in and then put a Delaware framework on top of

5

answers that I will have been given."

6
7

If that's what I
wait?

MR.
think,

can just plug

could do,

why not

Why not chill out?

8

9

I

of

TAYLOR:

like you said,

I

Well,

Your Honor,

I

think the issues that are

10

going to be dealt with,

the factual issues that are

11

going to be dealt with in the securities action,

12

minor,

13

that maybe we've answered some of the questions about

14

knowledge with respect to -- with the 220 documents

15

that,

16

can't discuss.

17

front

play a minor role in our case.

obviously,

And I

are

think

have been placed under seal and I
So I

think those issues are already in

of the Court now.

18

And to the extent that California has

19

to get to those issues,

20

for them because we already have those issues in front

21

of the Court.

22
23
24

it doesn't make sense to wait

I'm sorry.

Do you have any other

THE COURT:

No.

questions?
Not at the moment.

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

0527

15

MR.

1

2

TAYLOR:

Thank you,

Your

Honor.

3

THE COURT:

4

Reply?

5

MR.

6

Great.

Thank you.

LANSTRA:

Your Honor,

if I may,

just a couple points in rebuttal.
Look,

7

we can only go with what's in

8

the complaint.

9

they've decided they only want to go with

And i t ' s not my

job to figure out why

10

spring-loading now that there's been a motion to stay,

11

but there are DreamTeam allegations throughout the

12

complaint.

13

The very first paragraph of the

14

complaint states,

15

consolidated stockholder derivative action on behalf

16

of" the company's directors -- "on behalf of

17

company]

18

of:

19

options

20

promotion firm

(a)

"Plaintiffs are bringing this

to remedy defendants'

[the

wrongful conduct

granting themselves spring-loaded stock
and

21

(b)

secretly engaging a stock

"
They may argue that we're really

22

pushing the stock options,

23

there,

24

that way.

and I

but the DreamTeam is in

suppose someone could read the other case
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I want to really point out the

1

2

primary -- just to make clear,

if I

3

there are Delaware questions of law,

4

Honor should answer them when the time comes.

5

not believe that the breach of fiduciary claims as a

6

matter of law are before the Court in California.

7

do not believe they will be.

8

you said,

Your Honor.

9

overlap:

Was there spring-loaded option grants made

we believe Your
We do

We

They're questions of fact that

Were there misrepresentations?

as a matter of fact?

11

Those are at issue in both cases.

13

if

They are exactly like

10

12

didn't before,

THE COURT:

Great.

Why don't you

segue into the motion to dismiss.

14

MR.

LANSTRA:

15

Your Honor,

Will do.
in essence,

the plaintiffs

16

are alleging that the defendants learned of favorable

17

clinical trial results on December 9th.

18

December 10th,

19

Thereafter,

20

publicly and the stock price experienced a temporary

21

increase as a result.

22

that is what is alleged.

23
24

On

the comp committee made option grants.

the clinical trial results were released

The way we read the complaint,

We believe under both Tyson and
Desimone put together that that's not enough.

There
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1

is a test that's set forth.

2

according to a shareholder-approved comp plan?

3

We believe that they've alleged that.

4

directors possess material nonpublic information soon

5

to be released that would impact the company's share

6

price?

7

conceded that.

2(a),

We believe they've alleged that.

8
9

Were the options issued

It's Part 2(b)

Yes.

did the

We've

that is not alleged.

Did the directors issue these options with the intent

10

to circumvent otherwise valid shareholder-approved

11

restrictions?

12

frankly,

There are no allegations outside of,

the temporal relationship.

13

The plaintiffs are asking for the

14

intent to be inferred.

15

inferences that were made in Tyson and Weiss.

16

don't think that that type of inference is there.

17

They're relying on the
We

There are little pieces in all the

18

cases,

19

inference of intent in Tyson and Weiss had a

20

with the repeated number.

21

free pass,

22

i t ' s the repeated number of times that they did this

23

and the moving of the dates of the stock options.

24

including this one,

but the facts

supporting
lot to do

This doesn't mean you get a

as they were arguing in the opposition,

The allegations here,

but

the only factual
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1

allegations,

actually suggest the opposite:

2

decision to grant was made in October;

3

of grants were annually made at the December meeting;

4

no options were exercised;

5

allegations that the announcement itself was moved.

7

Why does the failure to

exercise matter?
MR.

8
9

that decisions

and there are no

THE COURT:

6

that the

LANSTRA:

Well,

it runs to intent.

I don't think it runs to the damages.

I

think that

10

was what we saw in the opposition,

11

doesn't mean that there aren't damages.

12

it does matter when you're saying what's the intent.

13

The intent here is there is a deception.

There is an

14

intent to take advantage of a situation.

None of

15

these directors and none of the officers have taken

16

advantage of these allegedly low-ball options.

17

well,

I ' l l leave it at that.
THE COURT:

18
19

was a response that

And I

But I

think

And

think --

What's the life of these

options?

20

MR.

LANSTRA:

21

THE COURT:

Ten years.
So,

I mean,

it just -- it

22

seems to me that if you get an option,

I mean,

having

23

it allegedly underpriced is nice,

24

necessarily have to go out and exercise it right away.

but you don't
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1

MR.

2

think that's right.

3

asked to take an inference from something that's

4

simply an allegation of the timing sequence and when

5

we're trying to figure out is there an inference

6

there -- you have other courts saying,

7

it a bunch of times.
I

8

9

LANSTRA:
But,

No.

again,

That's fair.

I

when you're being

"Well,

just

they did

They moved dates."

actually do think that the fact that

they didn't run out right away and exercise the

10

options and make immediate money does suggest

11

something.

12

I mean,

13

then maybe we would have gotten some inference there.

14

Then there's something to hold onto.

15

It certainly doesn't suggest the opposite.

if they had ran out and did the exercises,

THE COURT:

Say they were just stupid.

16

Like even guys who rob a bank know to lay low for a

17

while and not to go out and spend a bunch of money

18

that would call attention to themselves.

19

sort of like shooting up a flare if you do that,

20

it?

21

MR.

LANSTRA:

22

I will say,

I mean,

it's
isn't

Fair enough.
Your Honor,

23

is being asked about on the timing.

24

request.

They got the minutes.

the same thing

They did a 220

And the same day,
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1

December 9th,

that the directors are talking about the

2

clinical results,

3

grants.

4

intent to deceive,

5

sense either,

6

about both of them right out in the open while,

7

meanwhile,

8

this.

they're also talking about option

So if there is an inference to be made of

So I

that doesn't really make a lot of

the idea that they're going to talk

they have a deceptive scheme of fraud to do
think there's many different ways.

9

My basic point,

though,

is that all

10

they've alleged is this temporal sequence,

11

just doesn't seem enough.

If that were the case,

12

might as well remove 2(b),

because the fact of the

13

directors possessing the material nonpublic

14

information would be enough and we wouldn't need an

15

intent to circumvent.

16

that if you have

(a),

The plaintiffs'

THE COURT:

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR.

LANSTRA:

21

MS.

WINCHESTER:

LANSTRA:

we

argument is

you necessarily have

17

and that

(b).

Anything else?
No,

Your Honor.

Great.
Thank you.
Good morning,

Your

22

Honor.

As we pled -- as we stated in our opposition

23

brief,

24

Delaware law to satisfy the pleading burden at this

we pled everything that is necessary under
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1

stage,

which is that we raise a reasonable inference

2

that the board of directors intentionally violated the

3

stock option plan that was approved by the

4

stockholders which did not allow spring-loading.

5

did so with the possession of material inside

6

information.

7

They

The Tyson case sets forth the factors

8

that need to be pled,

9

hands-down.

One,

and we pled each of those,

the plaintiff has to establish that

10

grants were given pursuant to an options plan.

11

was done.

12

option plan.

13

directors who approved the plan or approved the

14

grants,

15

information.

16

received the information at the December 9 board

17

meeting.

That

They were granted pursuant to the 2008

one,

Two,

the plaintiff establishes that the

possessed the material inside
We know that.

We did a 220.

They

Not only did the board receive that

18
19

information,

but each of the option recipients

20

received that information.

21

they knew that it was material inside information

22

because the general counsel told them,

23

material inside information.

24

about it."

There is no question that

"This is

You can't tell anybody
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1

Then they decided to grant the

2

options.

Not only did they decide to grant the

3

options,

4

stock price was slightly lower than it was on the 9th,

5

but they also did so with 80,000 more per director

6

than they had agreed to several months prior.

7

was no preset date here.

the following day,

8
9

when,

by the way,

At the October board meeting,
said,

the

There

they

"We' re going to grant options in December."

10

Even if they had said they were going to grant options

11

on December 10th,

12

information at the time that they made the grants,

13

and,

14

they issued the options with an intent to circumvent

15

the stockholder-approved plans.

importantly,

they still possessed material inside

and this goes to the second point,

16

As the Weiss Court said,

17

they didn't disclose that they used this

18

information when they made the grants is enough to

19

raise a reasonable doubt and an inference that they

20

purposely violated the 2008 plan.

21

And here,

the fact that
inside

unlike in Weiss and unlike

22

in Tyson,

not only did they violate the terms of the

23

2008 plan,

24

specifically said the option grants had to be made at

which did not allow spring-loading,

which
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l

fair market value,

which was not fair market value

2

when you know the stock price is going to pop the next

3

day with the company's most important news in history,

4

but here you have an affirmative disclosure that

5

do not spring-load."

"We

6

So taken together,

7

at this stage of the pleadings enough to raise an

8

inference that the board cannot consider a demand.

9

Because not only do you have a majority of the

10

six-member board,

11

but each of the six members received the options.

12

There is no Delaware case law at all that exists that

13

says that recipients of improper option awards get a

14

free pass one time that they do it.
Your Honor,

15
16

four of them,

there's certainly

I

THE COURT:

18

MS.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR.

21

Honor,

22

again --

24

there's nothing more that

need to add unless you have any questions.

17

23

granted the options,

I would

I don't.

WINCHESTER:

LANSTRA:

Thank you.

You're welcome.

Reply?
Just briefly,

Your

just point out that there are no facts,

THE COURT:

What would have happened

if the CEO had traded on December 10th,

bought shares?
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MR.

1

LANSTRA:

If the CEO traded on

2

December 10th and bought shares.

3

be -- we're talking about options being exercised.

4

go back to my earlier point.

5

something there for an inference.

that would

think maybe there's

7

shares -- I mean,

8

you'd be accepting that he was in possession of

9

material nonpublic inside information at the time he

10

you're accepting that he -- I

assume

would have acquired those shares.

11

And it seems to me that the logic of

12

your position would be that there would be no claim,

13

no indication of scienter,

14

unless and until he sold for profit.
MR.

15

and no possible claim,

LANSTRA:

Well,

16

know what the strike price was.

17

have to be other facts.

18
19

THE COURT:

No.

I

You know?
I would have to

think there would

He just goes out in

the market and buys.
MR.

20
21

I

If he bought those

THE COURT:

6

I

Well,

LANSTRA:

He's not taking the

options?
THE COURT:

22

I'm slightly varying the

So instead of getting beneficial ownership of

23

facts.

24

shares through options,

o ur CEO actually goes out and
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1

buys in the market on the 10th,

2

knows about the study but there isn't yet disclosure

3

of the study.

4

Again,

so at a time when he

it seems to me that the

5

implication of your argument is that he would have no

6

potential insider trading liability because one could

7

not infer scienter.

8

MR.

9

fair.

LANSTRA:

I don't think that's

know where you're heading,

I

10

scenario,

11

off of,

which I

but I

think in our

think is what we have to bounce this

you do have regular early times for things.

12

Let's say we take your position but we

13

also say that December 10th is his son's birthday,

14

on December 10th every year,

15

commitment or he's told his son --

16

THE COURT:

and

he's made either a

Let's make it a

little bit

17

more analogous.

18

because that's what they agreed to do in October.

19

They said,

20

historically done this stuff at year-end."

21

say that he has a historical pattern and practice of

22

buying shares in December.

23

the 5th.

24

he's a little bit slow.

Let's say in December,

"Let's price in December.

he buys,

We've
So let's

Sometimes he does it on

Sometimes he does it on the 15th.

Sometimes

He does it after Christmas,
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1

before New Year's.

2

assume that that's the case.

3

He's a December guy.

MR.

LANSTRA:

Right.

4

act unilaterally.

5

facts.

6

a committee that needs to convene,

7

schedule.

And I

But he gets to

think we have to separate the

He's acting unilaterally.

8

9

I

So let's

He's not acting as
that has set a

think that that does matter here.
Yes.

Look,

I

think you're probably

closer if you had a committee that didn't have a

10

meeting scheduled;

11

meetings for three straight years;

12

indicated in October that they were going to issue

13

grants;

14

committee acts on December 10th.

15

being asked to take an inference from allegations that

16

just aren't applied.

and then

17

that hadn't done this at their
that hadn't

just a one-member compensation

THE COURT:

But, ·again,

All right.

Great.

18

interrupted you with my question,

19

there were other points you wanted to make.

20

MR.

LANSTRA:

you're

I

so I don't know if

Actually,

21

point I make got embodied in my answer.

22

your time,

I

believe the
Thank you for

Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

24

MS.

You're a good advocate.

WINCHESTER:

If I

can address one
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1

thing.

2

THE COURT:

3

MS.

Sure.

WINCHESTER:

They found out on the

4

9th the material information.

5

disclosed the information on that date and granted the

6

following day,

7

we wouldn't be here today.

8

THE COURT:

9

10

They could have

which was when they granted,

I

and then

assume you'd say they

could have done other things.

They could have

rescheduled the meeting.

11

MS.

WINCHESTER:

12

9th and they met on the 10th.

13

information on the 9th.

14

THE COURT:

15

they could have said,

16

right time to do this."
MS.

17

Well,

They found out the

Right.

But on the 10th,

"You know what?

WINCHESTER:

they met on the

Now is not the

"We have inside

18

information we're not allowed to use to our

19

advantage."
THE COURT:

20

"We ought to come back

21

right after Christmas and do this," or something like

22

that.

23
24

MS. WINCHESTER:

Or when we file our

proxy with the disclosure of the grants and say that
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1

we don't spring-load,

2

the way,

3

which they didn't do.

"Hey,

by

we spring-loaded a couple of months ago,"

4
5

they could have said,

THE COURT:

Thank you,

everyone.

I'm

going to go ahead and give you my answer now.
There's two things for us to address

6

7

today,

collectively:

the motion to stay and the motion

8

to dismiss.

9

I'm going to grant in part the motion to stay and I'm

So for the reasons I'm going to give you,

10

going to deny in its entirety the motion to dismiss as

11

to the aspects of the claims that I

am not staying.

12

The factual background is as follows:

13

The plaintiffs are stockholders of CytRx Corporation.

14

The nominal defendant,

15

corporation with its principal place of business in

16

Los Angeles.

17

development company specializing in oncology,

18

cancer-related things.

19

and officers of CytRx.

CytRx,

is a Delaware

It's a biopharmaceutical research and
so

The defendants are directors

The key facts are as follows:

20

the company commenced a -- I

In

21

December 2011,

22

say,

23

have to assume they're true for purposes of today,

24

that's why I

these are allegations.

should

They're not facts,

but I
so

call them facts.
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In December 2011,

1

the company

2

commenced a Phase 2b clinical trial to evaluate the

3

preliminary efficacy and safety of its primary drug,

4

aldoxorubicin.

5

time frame,

6

investors that the effect of the results,

7

implications of the results of the Phase 2b trial,

8

would be critical.

During the March and September 2013

there was indications from analysts and

On December 9,

9

2013,

the

all of the

10

individual defendants attended a board meeting during

11

which they were informed that the Phase 2b clinical

12

results were positive.

13

results of the trial would be "transformational."

14

They were also reminded that this information was

15

nonpublic and confidential.

They were informed that the

The very next day,

16

December 10,

2013,

17

the compensation committee granted options to purchase

18

2,925,000 shares of the company's common stock at a

19

strike price of $2.39 per share.

20

the trading price of the company's stock.

21

time,

22

about the very positive and transformational clinical

23

results of the Phase 2b trials.

24

closed,

That at the time was
At the

the company had not released any information

After the market

the company indicated that it would announce
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1

the results the next day.
On the next day,

2

the company issued a

3

press release before the market opened touting the

4

positive results of the trials.

5

favorably,

6

to $3.90 per share on the open and closing at $4.02

7

per share.

8

high of $6.12 per share the next day.

The market reacted

with the company's stock price gapping up

The company stock price reached a two-year

So just to review,

9

December 9th,

you

10

find out about these great transformational results.

11

December 10th,

12

a time when you know these results are confidential

13

and that the information is not public,

14

yourself and your senior officers approximately

15

3 million options at a strike price reflecting the

16

price of the stock without any market knowledge of

17

this information.

18

the information,

19

spikes.

before the results are disclosed and at

you grant

And then the next day,
and then,

indeed,

you release

the stock price

There has been this lawsuit here as

20
21

well as lawsuits elsewhere filed regarding this

22

behavior,

23

company's disclosures.

24

as well as some others regarding the

For example,

on January 30,

2014,

the
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1

company announced a stock offering and filed ~

2

prospectus with the SEC .

3

$7.98 per share after that announcement.

4

The stock price increased to

In March 2014,

it was disclosed that

5

the company had hired a firm called the DreamTeamGroup

6

to promote the company's stock.

7

that alleged that insiders were involved in drafting

8

or editing the DreamTeam articles and that those

9

articles were designed to pump up the company's stock

10

There are reports

price.

11

There are currently three federal

12

securities class actions pending in Federal Court in

13

California addressing the DreamTeam allegations and

14

the alleged pumping up of the stock price.

15

also some derivative actions in California.

16

There are

The complaint here focuses principally

17

on the grant by the insiders of the stock options to

18

themselves.

19

allegations.

20

It does mention secondarily the DreamTeam

The first motion,

the motion to stay,

21

seeks to stay this action in deference to the

22

California federal securities actions.

23
24

It is certainly true that this Court
often stays derivative actions that have been filed as
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1

follow-on indemnification-oriented proceedings that

2

seek to recover the damages suffered by a company as a

3

result of bad disclosures.

In that type of scenario,

4

it makes eminent sense for

the disclosure claims to go

5

first.
Part of what you have to figure out in

6
7

the indemnification action is,

8

suffered any harm and,

9

before you can figure out whether there's anything to

B,

A,

whether the company

the amount that it suffered

10

indemnify.

11

eminent sense for the Delaware derivative action to be

12

stayed.

13

So in that type of context,

In this case,

however,

i t makes

that is not
The principal

14

what the principal claims are doing.

15

claims in this case allege a self-interested

16

compensation decision by the fiduciaries

17

corporation.

18

Delaware law wrong.

This is alleged to be a

of a Delaware

substantive

The primary issue here is not one of

19

20

disclosure.

21

enterprising plaintiffs'

22

reframing substantive wrongs as disclosure claims so

23

as to get them into Federal Court.

24

substantive wrong and you don't accurately disclose

One can reframe it as disclosure,

and

lawyers are very good at

So if you have the
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1

that you have engaged in the substantive wrong,

2

plaintiff can allege that you have a disclosure claim

3

because you failed to disclose that you were doing

4

these bad things.

5

The meat of the claim,

though,

a

is the

6

underlying substantive wrong,

and the disclosure claim

7

only rises or falls based on what is a matter of

8

Delaware law and substantive corporate law.

9

the exact opposite of a case like a tagalong

That's

10

indemnification claim,

11

one of disclosure and the Delaware law issue only

12

arises depending on the outcome of the federal

13

disclosure claim.

14

Here,

where the substantive wrong is

in my view,

as to the

15

overcompensation claims,

the self-interested

16

compensation claims,

17

In my view,

18

be bad policy to defer to a federal securities action

19

that is primarily concerned with disclosures over a

20

broader period of time and concerned with potentially

21

moving money from one group of stockholders to

22

another.

23

behavior of fiduciaries,

24

Delaware concern.

the core wrong is a Delaware one.

there is no reason to defer and it would

What the Delaware case is about is the
which is a quintessentially
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1

If I reframe this analysis in the

2

technical language of the McWane doctrine,

3

the framework in which it has been briefed,

4

doctrine seeks to address when a second-filed action

5

should defer to a first-filed action.

6

want is duplicative lawsuits.

7

minimize overall litigation costs.

8
9

Here,
action,

which is
the McWane

What you don't

What you want is to

the federal securities law

although it touches on some similar factual

10

issue,

it is not sufficiently overlapping with the

11

Delaware action to,

12

first-filed under McWane.

13

that I've already addressed.

in my view,

be treated as

And that's for the reasons

Another important factor in

14
15

determining whether a stay is appropriate is the first

16

Court's ability to render justice.

17

securities action is involved in rendering justice on

18

different theories to different stockholders regarding

19

different claims.

20

of this case,

21

fiduciaries.

22

The federal

It does not address the . core issue

which is self-dealing by Delaware

I

could also analyze this under the

23

guise of forum non conveniens,

which asks which Court

24

is best suited to address the matter and whether there
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1

would be overwhelming prejudice to the defendants from

2

litigating here.

3

overwhelming prejudice to fiduciaries of a Delaware

4

corporation to litigate breach of fiduciary duty

5

claims in Delaware.

Certainly,

Now,

6

I

don't think there is

where I do think the defendants

7

have a point is as to the allegations of the complaint

8

relating to the secondary stock offering or the

9

DreamTeam.

Those,

I

think,

are primarily federal

10

issues about the disclosures that were made to

11

stockholders and whether those disclosures pumped up

12

or otherwise manipulated the stock price.

13

primarily a federal concern,

14

Disclosure is historically principally a federal

15

concern,

16

markets.

17

That's

not a Delaware concern.

at least in terms of companies on the public

It is not clear,

or not entirely

18

clear,

19

plaintiffs intend to litigate those matters.

20

are some allegations in the complaint that suggest

21

they do intend to litigate some of those things here.

22

from the complaint to what degree the

To avoid any confusion,

I

There

am going to

23

grant the motion to stay to the extent the plaintiffs

24

seek to litigate anything about the DreamTeam or the
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1

secondary offering.

2

with,

3

the federal securities action.

I

think those allegations overlap

to a greater degree,

and should be litigated in

By contrast,

4

am going to deny the

I

5

stay to the extent the complaint attacks the allegedly

6

self-interested decision that was made on December

7

10th and the sequence of events that occurred on the

s·

9th,

9

the insiders of stock options with a strike price of

10th,

and 11th that resulted in the receipt by

10

$2.39 per share at a time when,

11

allegations of the complaint,

12

possessing material nonpublic information about a

13

Phase 2 trial that would be transformational for the

14

company and the single biggest event in the company's

15

history.

16

according to the

those insiders were

My discussion of the facts has likely

17

foreshadowed the reasoning that goes into my denial of

18

the motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1.

19

designed to ensure that the appropriate corporate

20

decision-makers have the ability to decide whether to

21

bring a corporate claim.

22

able to divest the appropriate corporate

23

decision-maker of its ability to decide what to do

24

with a claim simply by bringing suit.

Rule 23.1 is

A stockholder should not be

Where,

however,
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1

the appropriate corporate decision-makers are disabled

2

because of self-interest,

3

Here,

demand is excused.

there was a

six-member board.

4

Four of the members were part of the compensation

5

committee that granted the options,

6

themselves.

7

This is quintessentially self-interested conduct to

8

which entire fairness applies.

including to

All of the directors received options.

To the extent that there is a need for

9

10

scienter,

I

do think that in this case,

11

inference of scienter.

12

where you're talking about,

13

directors had knowledge about inside information,

14

as quarterly results,

15

on a regular date,

16

countervailing factor that mitigates the inference of

17

scienter.

18

there is an

It may well be that in a case
generally,

whether

a periodic granting of options

according to a preset time,

Here,

such

is a

we're talking about a situation

19

where people got news about the company that was going

20

to be transformational,

21

was material.

22

disclosure,

23

officers 3 million options.

24

not the 100,000 options each that originally were

knew it was nonpublic,

The very next day,

knew it

before there was any

they granted themselves and senior
They granted themselves
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1

contemplated in October but actually bumped the number

2

up to 180,000 options each.

3

myriad ways for them to not act so as to receive this

4

rather substantial benefit in terms of the strike

5

price below where the market price was likely to

6

settle and what the intrinsic value of the share

7

likely was.

8

been to simply postpone the meeting until after the

9

news was released.

There would have been

one ea s y method of doing s·o would have

By that I mean postpone the

10

December 10th meeting at which the options were

11

granted.

12

When you have this type of

13

eyebrow-raising self-interested conduct,

14

you haven't done it a lot doesn't defeat an inference

15

of scienter.

16

historically to grant options in December doesn't

17

defeat an inference of scienter.

18

the fact that

The fact that you may have planned

Nobody said you had to do it on

19

December 10th when you knew this stuff and the market

20

didn't.

21

market would have known it.

22

it on December 10th,

23

determination about what the fair market value was on

24

that date,

How about December 20th?

At that point,

the

If you really had to do

you might have tried to make a

assuming full knowledge by a willing buyer
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1

and seller of all material information and a buyer and

2

seller not under any compulsion to buy or compulsion

3

to sell.

4

So both for purposes of the first and,

5

indeed,

6

futile.

the second prong of Aronson,

7

Likewise,

8

12 (b) (6),

9

23 .1,

I think demand is

for purposes of Rule

having withstood the higher standard of Rule

the complaint states a claim.
Just so I'm not accused of glomming

10
11

everything together,

12

of the counts.

13

I

Count I

will go through,

briefly,

is framed precisely as a
In my view,

14

granting-of-spring-loaded options claim.

15

this case is controlled by Weiss and Tyson.

16

like Desimone,

17

allegations,

18

each

A case

which involves much less egregious

is clearly distinguishable.
It really would be difficult to design

19

a fact pattern that would more graphically capture

20

what spring-loading is all about.

21

law school hypothetical in terms of what you would

22

want to have factually to really put the policy

23

question directly at issue as to whether this is the

24

type of permissible behavior in which fiduciaries

It's almost like a

can
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1

engage.

2

So Count I

3

Count II alleges waste.

states a claim.
Waste is

4

normally really hard to allege.

I mean it's easy to

5

allege.

6

because you have to allege a transaction that no

7

reasonable person would approve.

8

economic terms so one-sided as to create an inference

9

that people weren't acting in good faith.

It's hard to survive a motion to dismiss

10

Here,

In other words,

you actually have it,

what the allegation is,

because,

11

basically,

12

directors found a way to give themselves dollars for

13

25 cents.

14

because of the transformational news that they knew

15

and the market didn't,

16

greater than the $2.39 strike price.

17

ultimately went up to 7-ish bucks a share.

18

because they used the market price where the market

19

did not know about this information,

20

price the options for approximately 25 percent or a

21

third of that.

22

cents.

In other words,

23
24

is that the

the stock at the time,

had a fair market value far
Indeed,

it

But

they were able to

So they got dollars for 25 cents or 33

Would an ordinary person swap dollars
for 25 cents?

No.

An ordinary person,

if you go up
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1

to them and say,

2

$1,"

"I've got $5.

How about you give me

they're not going to do that deal.

3

For fiduciaries to say,

"Yes,

we will

4

do that deal" raises an inference of waste.

5

the type of transaction that no reasonable person

6

would agree to.

7

eventually prove i t ' s not a waste,

8

purposes,

9

cents or whatever the exact number works out to be,

10

That is

That doesn't mean you can't
but for pleading

giving yourself dollars for

25 cents or 33

that's waste.

11

Count III alleges more generally a

12

breach of the duty of loyalty.

13

we're talking about here.

14

that,

15

appears self-interested such that you give yourself

16

assets for less than their fair value,

17

breach of the duty of loyalty stuff.

18

certainly states a claim.

19

That's really what

When you engage in behavior

based on the allegation of the complaint,

that's classic
So Count III

And Count IV reframes these theories

20

as unjust enrichment.

21

assuming that none of the other theories apply.

22

the idea of unjust enrichment is the unjust retention

23

of a benefit that you really shouldn't have gotten.

24

When you get dollars for whatever it works out to be,

That is a fallback claim,
But
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1

25 cents,

33 cents,

because you priced at the market

2

when you hadn't told the market about this

3

transformational information,

4

enriching yourself.

you're unjustly

So Count IV states a claim.

I doubt i t ' s the claim that ultimately

5
6

would

7

to bet,

8

been alleged,

9

Count III without having to reach Count II and Count

10

IV.

justify relief in this case.

Indeed,

if I

had

assuming the allegations prove out as they've
I

would expect to rest on Count I

But i t ' s there.

11

or

It states a claim.

Lastly,

in terms of Section 102 (b) (7),

12

this is self-interested conduct to which exculpation

13

under Section 102(b)

14

(7)

doesn't apply.

So those are my rulings.

Whatever you

15

all want to do about implementing this is fine with

16

me.

17

queue on this or not.

18

probably be good to have something shorter and more to

19

the point than this transcript making clear that

20

have stayed as to the secondary offering and the

21

DreamTeam.

I

22

can't remember whether I
But I

have things in my

do think it would

I

What's going to go forward here and

23

what I

would like you all to work out a schedule on so

24

that this will get promptly to trial is the events of
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1

December 9th,

2

grants.

10th and 11th and the stock option

3

And I

say get promptly to trial

4

because this is a complaint that was based on some

5

books and records obtained pursuant to Section 220.

6

When you've got this sequence -- and again,

7

turns out that the plaintiffs have made this stuff up

8

and the board actually didn't have the study on

9

December 10th,

that's a different story.

10

all kinds of bigger problems.

11

as pled here,

12

judgment motion.

13

from which one could infer bad behavior.

if it

Then there's

But if the sequence is

don't think you have a viable summary

I

think you have facts and evidence

I

14

Now,

15

those inferences shouldn't be drawn.

16

on the up and up.

17

that could be made on a summary judgment record.

18

somebody may prove at trial,

no,

Everything was

But those aren't determinations

Perhaps you all can convince me

19

otherwise.

But what I

think,

as a case management

20

matter,

21

this to trial this year,

22

We could all get back together around the time that

23

school is starting.

24

deal was and what ended up happening.

you all ought to do is figure out a way to get
ideally,

maybe third quarter.

And we can find out what the real
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1

All right.

So Mr.

Lanstra,

2

movant.

3

Is there anything I

4

anything I haven't sufficiently covered?

Do you have any questions about my rulings?

MR.

5

6

can elaborate on?

LANSTRA:

No,

Is there

Your Honor.

THE COURT:

8

Ms.

Great.

Winchester and Mr.

Taylor,

I guess,

Ms.

11

basically agreed with you,

12

concerns.

13

Mr.

Winchester,

since I

you probably don't have any

Taylor,

is there anything in the

14

first instance that you are unclear about,

15

I have stayed and haven't stayed?

16

MR.
clear.

THE COURT:

No,

Your Honor .

Very

Ms.

Winchester,

how about

you?

20

21

TAYLOR:

about what

Thank you.

18
19

how

about you?

10

17

Thank

you.

7

9

you're the

MS.

WINCHESTER:

I have no questions,

Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

Great.

Thank you,

23

everyone,

24

you all in due course and getting a schedule.

for coming in.

I ' l l look forward to seeing
I
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1

2

appreciate everyone's time and stay warm.
(Court adjourned at 11:55 a.m.)
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